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ABSTRACT  
 
Advanced central banks have increased their balance sheets after the financial crisis which has 
raised concerns amongst market participants. However, there is no empirical evidence to 
provide guidance to on the optimal point of asset purchases. This paper examines spillover 
effects of unconventional monetary policy announcements from four advanced central banks 
on emerging market asset prices for the period 2009 to 2016. Vast amount of literature so far 
has focused on the spillover effects on advanced economies and mainly concentrates on 
announcements from the Federal Reserve. The research estimates the two day change on 15 
emerging market economies’ asset prices. The results show that emerging market currencies 
exhibit higher returns against the Japanese Yen during the two day window period of the 
announcement being made. Bonds were more reactive to unconventional monetary policy than 
equities on days that announcements were made. Expectations of market participants were 
considered which showed that announcements made by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) were more 
anticipated by market participants which is an indication of how effective implementation of 
forward guidance has been over the years. The words and phrases used in making 
unconventional monetary policy announcements have had a significant effect on asset prices 
after the financial crisis. 
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        CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1 Background and context 
As feedback from the global financial crisis, major central banks have loosened their monetary 
policy from using conventional monetary policy to unconventional monetary Policy (UMP) 
which has prompted a global search for yield with investors flocking into Emerging Market 
Economies (EME). This has contributed to a broader mispricing of emerging market asset 
prices. Rey and Agrippino (2014) found that monetary policy in the United States is connected 
to a global factor in risky asset prices, cross border credit flows and specifically to U.S and 
European banks leverage. For the purpose of this study, the advanced economy central banks 
that were chosen were U.S Federal Reserve Bank (FED), Bank of England (BOE), Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) and European Central Bank (ECB) whose currencies are the most traded by value.  
After the financial crisis, monetary policies tools such as the Taylor rule have proven 
to be ineffective, hence, the major central banks turned to use UMP. The continuous 
implementation of conventional monetary policy meant that the short term interest rate could 
not be altered as recommended by the Taylor rule; the expectations on the markets rates were 
different from the actual impact which meant that the monetary transmission mechanism 
wasn’t working. Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012), assess the level of monetary policy rates 
from a global perspective since the mid-1990s and find that the policy rates in advanced 
economies and EMEs were in totality below the rates recommended by the Taylor over the past 
10 years. During the recession of 2008 – 2009, policy rates were within the recommendations 
of the Taylor rule but deviated and narrowed again in the first quarter of 2012 during the 
European debt crisis. Taylor (2012) argues that the deviation from the recommendation of the 
Taylor rule suggests a change in policy regime which is a conclusion rejected by Bernanke 
(2010)1. The findings of Taylor (2012) are at odds with the findings of Hofmann and 
Bogdanova (2012) who caution that the Taylor rules involve assumptions about unobservable 
concepts, hence, must be taken with caution. The Taylor rule does not account for changes in 
the reserve requirements which occurred after the crisis2. 
                                                          
1 Bernanke (2010) argues that the consistent mismatch between policy rates and Taylor recommendations is erased 
when inflation forecasts and real time output gap are used in the setting of the benchmark.  
2 BIS (2012), indicates that the Taylor rule might exercise a level of downside bias in the bust resulting from side 
effects of prolonged low interest rates. 
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There are different kinds of UMP but during the period post the financial crisis, 
Quantitative Easing (QE) has taken the high profile form in major central banks. The phrase 
QE was first applied in the Japanese economy during the 1990s as it handled the real estate 
bubble and the deflationary pressures. When interest rates reached the zero lower bound, the 
BOJ aimed at supporting the banking sector by buying government securities in order to 
increase liquidity in the market. The FED, the ECB and BOE all followed the same stance in 
adopting policies even though there are significant differences in the way that UMP such as 
QE have been implemented in the different jurisdictions. 
Empirical results strongly find that UMP implemented in developed countries post the 
financial crisis exert overabundance effects on global financial markets. Glick and Leduc 
(2012), Chen, Griffoli & Sahay (2012), and IMF (2013b) found that the yields on long term 
and short corporate and government bonds drop in response to expansionary announcements. 
Due to the inverse relationship that exists between bond prices and yields, bond prices rise as 
yields drop. The drop in the yields stimulates aggregate demand domestically while enabling 
investors to search for higher yields in foreign markets transferring capital away from the 
country that has announced accommodative monetary policy. This appreciates the spot 
exchange rate in the country to which the capital is transferred relative to the country that is 
implementing an expansionary UMP as investors demand the local currency, while data on the 
spillover effects on gross capital flows and equity prices is blended (See IMF, 2013a; 
Fratzscher et al., 2013; Glick & Leduc, 2012; Ahmed & Zlate, 2014). Shin & Bruno (2013) 
reported results that showed a reduction in international banking flows since 2008 while there 
was a significant increase in equity flows and bonds to emerging markets. 
There has been a disruption in the trends in emerging markets whenever the major 
central banks signal to unwind or scale up UMP. For instance, tapering of QE caught the 
markets by surprise and created bouts of volatility across emerging markets due to signs of 
higher global rates which led to capital flights after investors realised the transition. IMF 
(2013a) evidence shows that, the implementation of UMP in advanced economies initiated 
capital flights to EMEs in search for higher yields and stronger growth3. The series of volatility 
                                                          
3 During the period 2010-2013 IMF (2013a) finds that, gross capital funds transfers to advanced economies 
declined substantially particularly to the euro area, while EMEs received almost half of all global capital flows. 
Contrary to the occurrence in other continents, EME in Europe received fewer capital flows due to the high debt 
levels that was built before the crisis which they endeavored to deleverage. This evidence is consistent with the 
findings of Ahmed and Zlate (2013) who conclude that portfolio flows, particularly debt, was a significant factor 
in determining the level of capital flows to EMEs. 
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in emerging markets witnessed a rise in global risk aversion with sharp correction as currencies 
depreciated, equity prices declined and there was also a reversal in capital flows (Sahay et al., 
2014). 
Generally, the magnitude of the spillover effects is a function of the UMP that is being 
implemented and how it has been characterised by the announcing central bank (See Fratzscher 
et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2012; IMF, 2013b). Domestic pull factors are equally important in 
explaining the differences of the observed scope and size of cross border effects of foreign 
monetary policy across recipient countries. The cyclical and structural factors are essential such 
as the presence of domestic financial markets, the extent of global economic and financial 
integration, the domestic macroeconomic policies and the domestic business cycle. 
Given the strong financial and trade linkages between advanced economies and 
emerging markets, an analysis of UMP announcements and the spillover effects is relevant. 
Advanced economies are becoming part of the shrinking world economy, this is likely to cause 
a change in the weight of portfolios investments as investors search for high economic growth 
rates which lead to higher returns and increased demand for capital. With interest rates at their 
zero lower bounds, advanced economies will continue to foster UMP in order to boost 
economic growth. Spillover and spillback effects are expected to continue affecting EMEs and 
advanced economies. 
In spite most of the UMP being set for the domestic economy in which they are 
implemented, a significant number of scholars argue that they create a ripple effect in 
international markets which is best captured in asset prices. Currently, most policy debates and 
contributions concentrate on UMP spillovers on emerging markets and not the announcements 
(See Bowman et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2012). Vast amount of the research focuses on the effect 
of FED UMP announcements on emerging markets and mainly focus on quantitative easing. 
There is limited evidence of the impact of the other big three central bank UMP announcements 
on emerging markets. 
This research seeks to fill in the gap by empirically assessing the impact of UMP 
announcements of the four main central banks which have the highest traded currencies (the 
FED, BOE, BOJ and ECB) on a wide range of emerging markets asset prices (exchange rates, 
equities and corporate and government bond yields).  
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1.2  Problem statement 
During the aftermath of the financial crisis, emerging market policy makers have continued to 
deal with uncertainty on the exit strategies and continuous application of UMP from advanced 
economies. The FED led other central banks in developed economies to aggressively pursue 
UMP in order to stabilize the financial system. There is no empirical evidence that provides 
the optimal point to which UMP must be implemented or the optimal point at which a central 
bank should begin unwinding its UMP.  
During the first 5 years after the crisis, the FED announced three rounds of QE in order 
to restore liquidity in the economy. The implementation of QE was not a new phenomenon to 
the BOJ after having faced deflation for over a decade. In April 2013, the BOJ doubled the 
amount of liquidity it injected in the market through the Qualitative and Quantitative Easing 
Programme (QQE). During the same month of 2013, the BOE announced that it was going to 
extend the Funding for Lending Scheme by one year, which it further extended by another two 
years in November 2015. During the month of May 2013, Ben S. Bernanke made two 
announcements in which he stated that the FED would either step up or step down its QE 
programme depending on the economic indicators while he only emphasized on the trimming 
of the programme during the second announcement. During the fall of 2013, the FED 
announced that it would begin tapering its QE programme in the following year. The ECB 
reduced its interest rates to as low as -0.2% in 2015 while the BOJ enhanced its UMP by 
announcing negative interest rates in January 2015.  
The inconsistent announcements in the different advanced central banks has brought 
about mixed expectations in different emerging market economies. The mixed announcements 
that were announced in 2013, witnessed a sell-off in emerging market currencies due to the 
fear of rising global borrowing costs. In the same year, emerging markets also fell by 13% 
(Reuters Business news, 2013). With the continuous slow global economic recovery, monetary 
policy in the advanced central banks remains stimulatory and will continue being implemented 
for an uncertain period especially for the BOJ and ECB. The accommodative monetary policy 
(UMP) is unprecedented with limited empirical evidence and theoretical underpinning making 
it less understood both by policy makers and market participants. The composition of the FED’s 
balance sheet, more specifically the level of bonds is catching the market’s attention and raising 
sentiments as to when the downsizing will begin. There remains uncertainty on the impact of 
the shrinking of the balance sheet both by policy makers and market participants (Bloomberg, 
2017). Announcements from the advanced central banks will continue having spillover effects 
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on prices on emerging market assets. Due to the continuous injection of excess liquidity in the 
global economy, emerging market asset prices will continue changing not based on 
fundamentals which can cause a bubble in these assets. 
Exit from the UMP will occur at different rates and times while emerging markets will 
be at different stages in their economic cycles. The unavoidable lack of consistency in the 
economic cycles across jurisdictions will have an impact on asset prices both in emerging 
markets and advanced economies. Individual central banks have domestic mandates embedded 
in their laws, therefore, advanced central banks are expected to exit UMP provided their 
domestic objectives are met. Implementation of policy based on domestic objectives has a 
ripple effect on emerging markets asset prices due to the linkages that exist between emerging 
market economies and advanced economies4. This will create a feedback mechanism as 
emerging markets will adjust their monetary policy to an optimal point in response to changes 
in the newly announced policy.  
To date, empirical evidence and policy debates concentrate predominantly focuses on 
the impact of US Unconventional Monetary Policy on emerging economies (See Chen et al., 
2011, 2015; Bowman et al., 2015), while only limited evidence exists on the impact of UMP 
announcements to emerging markets. In an effort to complement literature, we empirically 
examine the impact of UMP announcement by Central banks with the four mostly traded 
currencies against emerging market asset prices. 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
 To examine the extent to which financial markets anticipate content of the UMP statements. 
The degree to which market participants anticipate the contents of monetary policy 
announcements have an impact on the pricing of assets. If the contents of the monetary 
policy announcements are anticipated, asset prices reflect the content of the announcements 
in an efficient market and will not affect the asset prices. If the market is inefficient the 
monetary policy announcements will not be factored in the process of price discovery. 
Asset prices are expected to change ceteris paribus if the content of the announcements is 
                                                          
4 Emerging market business cycles are increasingly characterised by a sudden stop or reduction in capital inflow, 
counter cyclical current accounts and income volatility that is less than consumption volatility (Aguiar and 
Gopinath, 2007). On the other hand, developed markets have stable trends and reduced business cycle fluctuations 
due to the strong regulatory framework of the financial sector and the availability of vast securities such as put 
and call options for market participants or the central banks to resort to whenever their financial shocks. 
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not expected in an efficient market. The increase or decrease in the price will depend on 
whether the announcement is accommodative, restrictive or neutral.   
 To examine the changes in emerging market asset prices over a two day window period 
when UMP is announced.  
Unlike other studies done by other scholars that focus on advanced economies, this research 
analyses how asset prices in emerging markets react to unconventional  monetary policy 
announcements. It concentrates on a time after the 2008 financial crisis and uses a two day 
window period unlike other scholars in order to provide enough time for asset prices in 
emerging markets to reflect the information. Advanced economies have more efficient 
financial markets than emerging markets.  
 
 To examine the impacts of unconventional monetary policy on investor sentiments.  
Different scholars have measured the impacts of monetary policy announcements on 
investor sentiments. To date, there is no standard measure that captures investor sentiments, 
hence, different proxies are used for estimation. Theory and empirical evidence both 
indicate mispricing of assets can be catalyzed by sentiments. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
                                              LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  The Evolution of Central Bank Communication 
Central bank policy makers concealed most of the techniques that they used to implement 
monetary policy. Central bank conventional wisdom held that individuals involved in the 
formulation of monetary policy making should reveal as little as possible and should announce 
it in a way that it is not easily understood. Brunner (1981) provides the evidence to show that 
the art of central banking was only limited to superior individuals5: 
Central banking… thrives on a pervasive impression that [it]… is an esoteric art. 
Access to this art and its proper execution is confined to the initiated elite. The 
esoteric nature of the art is moreover revealed by an inherent impossibility to 
articulate its insights in explicit and intelligible words and sentences. 
 
More than decade later, Alan Blinder presented his view on how the intentions of the 
central bank must be communicated at the London School of Economics. Blinder (1998, p. 70-
72), stated that the communication was entangled and far from the main stream: 
Greater openness might actually improve the efficiency of monetary policy… 
[because] expectations about future central bank behaviour provide the essential link 
between short rates and long rates. A more open central bank… naturally conditions 
expectations by providing the markets with more information about its own view of 
the fundamental factors guiding monetary policy…, thereby creating a virtuous 
circle. By making itself more predictable to the markets, the central bank makes 
market reactions to monetary policy more predictable to itself. And that makes it 
possible to do a better job of managing the economy. 
 
 
During a Federal Reserve gathering at the Jackson Hole, Woodford (2001, p. 307 and 
312) stated that: 
                                                          
5 Brunner (1981), p5. The absurd words of Brunner catalyzed the evolution of central bank transparency. Central 
banks have transformed to make their policy understood by the public. 
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successful monetary policy is not so much a matter of effective control of overnight 
interest rates… as of affecting… the evolution of market expectations… [Therefore,] 
transparency is valuable for the effective conduct of monetary policy… this view has 
become increasingly widespread among central bankers over the past decade. 
 
These ideas from different scholars have reshaped the manner that central banks communicate 
their monetary policy. The BOE began to show transparency before most major central banks 
and was enthusiastic about the transformation while the ECB has endeavoured to be more 
transparent in communication to market participants than the FED since it began its operation 
in 1998. 
 
2.2  The Importance of Communication of Monetary Policy 
Central bank communication can be defined as a monetary policy tool that is used by central 
banks to convey information to financial markets participants and the general public 
concerning the objectives of monetary policy, the economic outlook, monetary policy strategy 
and the outlook for future policy decisions (Blinder et al., 2008). 
The ability of central banks to impact future market expectations of long term direction 
of overnight interest rates and not merely the level of short term interest rates determines its 
ability to impact the economy. Most market participants use long term interest rates to make 
their investment decisions. The Term Structure of interest rates shows the relationship between 
short term interest rates and long term interest rates on default free pure discount bonds 
(Westerfield, Ross & Jordan, 2006)6. By providing a schedule of interest rates overtime, the 
term structure incorporates markets expectations of future events. For instance, the future 
interest rates should approximately be: 
Rt = αn + (1/n) (rt + ret+1 + ret+2 +…+ ret+n-1) + ut                                         (2.1) 
Where Rt is the future rate, rt is the current short term interest rate, r
e
t+1 is today’s market 
expectations of long term interest rates (i.e. in period t+1, t+2… t+n-1), αn is a premium term 
and ut indicates a stochastic error term. Equation (2.1) explicitly indicates that medium and 
long term interest rates depend significantly on the general public’s expectations of future 
                                                          
6 Term structure of interest rates combines the effects of interest rate risk premium, real rate of interest and 
inflation premium. Ross et al. (1985) find that different factors play a role in determining term structure of interest 
rates which are risk aversion, preference about timing of consumption, anticipations and investment alternatives. 
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central bank policy. After the financial crisis of 2008, the major’s Central banks have had 
interest rates close to zero. According to equation (2.1), it means that the current rate does not 
matter, hence, the major central banks have shifted their focus on long term interest rates. 
Eggertsson & Woodford (2003) find that if short term interest rates are near zero or at zero, 
central bank communication becomes the pivotal role of monetary policy. The importance of 
communication is emphasized by central bankers as it is vital for the general public to be well 
informed (Yellen, 2014).  
Real activity and inflation dynamics are influenced by inflation expectations according 
to predictions of economic theory. For instance, the New Keynesian Phillips curve states that 
inflation пt, is a function of the labour market αt, expected inflation пet+1 and a supply shock ut: 
 пt = αt + пet+1 + ut                          (2.2) 
For a specific nominal interest rate, an increase in inflation expectations implies a 
higher real interest rate which should in turn imply lower consumption.  
Economic agents who receive the information communicated by central banks have 
different expectations. Expectations among economic agents are not homogeneous with major 
variations among participants of financial markets, professional forecasters and households 
(Carroll, 2003; Coibion & Gorodnichenko, 2015). Theoretically, пet+1 represents the 
expectations of price setters in equation (2.2). This implies that typical households’ inflation 
expectations have an impact on inflation dynamics since they play a role in setting of wages 
and prices. The majority of wholesalers and retailers do participate in the setting of prices and 
wages even though they are not reliant on inflation forecasts of professionals (Blinder et al., 
1998). Misunderstanding the information that is conveyed by central banks can lead to 
mispricing of assets. With interest rates having reached their lower bound, there is an increase 
on the premium of announcements made by central banks. Advanced economies have invested 
heavily on research trying to understand the impact of accommodative monetary policy when 
interest rates are at their lower bound as compared to emerging market economies. Central 
banks generally devote more in trying to estimate the economic outlook than other players in 
the financial market, hence, they are privy to more information than the general public. When 
the public is still in the learning process or do not know how to estimate the reaction function 
of the central bank (Taylor rule), the economy may not converge with the rational expectations 
equilibrium. Therefore, the central bank’s learning process can have a feedback effect on the 
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economy which can create indeterminate or unstable outcomes which can be avoided  by 
ensuring that communication is more effective (Eusepi & Preston, 2007).  
2.3  Content of Unconventional Monetary Policy Announcements 
Central bank announcements contain at least four aspects of monetary policy i.e. the 
rationale behind the formulation of certain monetary policy, the mandate and strategy, the 
economic projections and future monetary policy decisions.  
The independence of the central bank is vital for the financial sector to remain sound. 
The government enacts a given set of rules or laws which can be quantitative or qualitative. 
Quantitative targets such as inflation targets enable central banks to manage expectations of 
market participants. Quantitative targets provide a platform for the performance of the central 
bank to be assessed against its target (Eijffinger & Haan, 2000). We formulate a model to 
represent expectations of agents;  
             ret +j = Hj (yt, Rt, rt, . . ., st) + Ɛ                            (2.3) 
which is better understood by being informed of the quantitative targets of the central banks, 
which are used to assess the central bank’s performance of the central bank as shown in (2.4). 
            rt = G (y-y*t, Πt, Πt - Π*t, . . .) + Ɛ                (2.4) 
Knowing and understanding Π*t and y*t that enter the policy rule (2.4) is crucial in 
anchoring expectations of economic agents. Inflation expectations and the output gap have an 
impact on actual inflation which creates shocks that have an impact on short term interest rates. 
This can be prevented by anchoring of inflation expectations through communication of 
monetary policy. However, very few central banks if any communicate a correct policy rule 
(Blinder et al., 2008)7. This makes market participants to learn about the policy rule by 
listening, watching and monitoring the central bank’s actions. Therefore, the best way of 
improving policy predictability is for the central bank to enlighten financial market participants 
and the general public its way of thinking. This entails that the developments in the economy 
should feed into the relevant news for financial market participants to have a consensus as news 
is announced.   
                                                          
7Svensson (2003) finds that no central bank has committed to an instrument rule. Credibility of a central bank that 
makes a promise to the public to follow the Taylor rule would be enhanced if in addition it also publishes the 
output gap, Taylor coefficients and inflation, etc. Therefore, he questions why such a commitment is not made. 
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Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) use inflation expectations from the Michigan 
Survey of Consumers (MSC) and from the professional forecasters to estimate an augmented 
Philips curve. They find that the coefficient on consumer expectations is statistically significant 
and larger, suggesting that the expectations of price setters are similar to households’ 
expectations. The two argue that poor anchoring of household inflation expectations assists in 
explaining the missing disinflation of the Great Recession. Nalewaik (2016) argues that there 
exists a strong causality effect between inflation expectations and wages and prices before the 
1990s. After 1990, there has been an expectations causality break which explains the decline 
in inflation. Akerlof et al. (2000) found similar results and posits that the coefficient on 
expected inflation in the Philips curve has evolved with time. 
The central bank’s communication strategy includes estimates of future inflation, levels 
of unemployment, economic activity and its views regarding future monetary policy (forward 
guidance). The four central banks differ on how they communicate the different aspects of the 
economic outlook. Central banks periodically provide their forecasts of expected future 
inflation in different reports which are produced monthly or quarterly. This applies to inflation 
targeting central banks such as the BOE. Other central banks have adopted the elements of 
inflation targeting such the BOJ, FED, and ECB even though they do not announce it explicitly. 
In the case of the FED, assessments of each member of the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) is published using blue dots which indicates their view on the direction of future rates 
and maximum employment. The ECB introduced staff projections in 2001, which involve ECB 
staff submitting their macroeconomic projections to the governing council who then make a 
forecast of the economic outlook. In the context of the BOE, a fan chart is used which 
represents a probability distribution of projections8. 
2.4  Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy 
Woodford (2003) gives a broad spectrum of what is still considered as conventional monetary 
policy which is still being practised in countries like emerging market economies where interest 
rates are above the zero lower bound. Conventional monetary policy became ineffective after 
the financial crisis as the amount of liquidity increased which reduced interest rates to their 
                                                          
8 The fan chart is a method of communicating risks or uncertainty in forecasts which was initially used by the 
BOE. In March 2017, the FED for the first time published examples of chats that indicated uncertainty in its 
economic projections. This method has also been adopted by more than 20 central banks. The essence of fan charts 
is to make the market participants and the general public understand the degree of uncertainty around the forecasts 
without explicitly stating the accuracy. 
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zero lower bound. This became known as the zero lower bound problem9. Agents can hold 
non-interest bearing cash which makes the Taylor rule ineffective as it would recommend 
nominal interest rates to fall below zero while markets interest rates are bounded by zero. 
Previous research before the financial crisis indicated that the zero lower bound constraint on 
policy interest rates is likely to be short lived and occur infrequently provided the inflation 
target is around 2% as the case with most advanced economies (Reifschneider and Williams, 
2000; Coenen et al., 2004). The events after the crisis have invalidated this view. For instance, 
QE has frequently been used in Japan while interest rates have modestly been low which 
indicates that the zero lower bound can occur for a longer time and more frequently. Central 
banks need to turn to unconventional monetary policy such as large scale asset purchases in 
order to reduce term premium and reduce risk, use of negative interest rates forward guidance 
about the future direction of policy, exchange rate intervention in order to boost exports and 
credit easing in order to stimulate the economy (Svensson, 2001; Bernanke, 2004). In spite of 
the several measures being taken up by central banks in advanced economies, returning their 
economies to full employment has been a struggle and reaching the optimal inflation target of 
2% has equally been challenging. The large scale asset purchase programme known QE has 
taken the highest form and has been used by the four central banks. Asset purchases made by 
the central bank can either be in the form of assets issued by corporates or government bonds. 
Asset purchases expand a central bank’s balance sheet and cause the portfolio rebalancing 
effect on assets held by the private sector. 
 
2.5  Mechanisms of Unconventional Monetary Policy  
Literature on UMP has shown a number of possible channels through which QE is likely to 
have an effect on interest rates which causes a ripple effect on the willingness of companies to 
recruit and invest or expand their operations, individuals’ propensity to spend and availability 
of bank credit facilities (Joyce et al., 2011). Implementation of UMP has an influence on the 
level of expected inflation, inflation and economic growth which also affect asset prices. The 
mechanisms listed are international portfolio re balancing, investor sentiments, liquidity, 
exchange rate and the signalling channel. 
                                                          
9 Due to sluggish economic growth and low inflation in different advanced economies, central banks such as the 
BOJ and ECB have introduced negative interest rates on deposits made by bank so that they can inject credit into 
the economy. Therefore, zero lower bound in this study is used to define the unusual situation were policy rates 
have been adjusted to below zero, at zero and slightly (0.25%) above zero.  
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2.5.1  International Portfolio Re-Balancing Channel 
This channel is based on the rationale that investor’s preference is skewed towards bonds with 
certain characteristics such as their yields (Vayanos and Villa, 2009)10. The portfolio 
rebalancing channel is set in motion by the purchase of long term securities which act on the 
term premium of long term nominal interest rates. Chen et al. (2012) states the notion that when 
nominal short term interest rates are at their zero lower bound, interest rates of different 
maturities can be reduced by purchasing assets, therefore affecting different segments of the 
yield curve. Therefore, a reduction in the risk premium as assets are purchased could be the 
most effective in flattening the yield curve.  
As foreign central banks implement accommodative UMP as they purchase bonds with 
their preferred characteristics, they reduce the amount of bonds held by the private sector and 
increase the level of cash. The increase in the sale of bonds increases the amount of statutory 
reserves held by commercial banks as liabilities in the central bank account. As the supply of 
the preferred bonds reduces it drives up the prices while there is a drop in the yield. The asset 
side of the central bank’s balance sheet increases as they purchase assets from the commercial 
banks or private sector which increases the degree of duration risk in the portfolio of optimal 
investor’s. The adjustment in the structure of assets held by optimal investors enables them to 
rebalance their portfolio in search for higher yields internationally for assets with sufficiently 
similar characteristics. Mortgage backed securities and government bonds sold by the 
commercial banks and the private sector are not perfect substitutes of base money (proceeds 
from the sale) hence stimulates the portfolio re balancing (Joyce et al., 2011). 
Investors exchange a long dated asset (government bond or mortgage backed security) 
for a short dated asset (money). Pension funds and insurance companies have portfolio that 
consists of long term liabilities that needs to be matched with long term assets after the 
composition of the portfolio has changed11. The increase in asset prices increases the wealth 
for risky asset holders as the capital gains rise while yields decline both internationally and 
domestically (Bauer and Neely, 2014). The Preferred Habitat (Modigilani & Sutch, 1966) best 
                                                          
10This channel was first described by Tobin (1961) who advocated how Central banks through changing quantities 
of assets with different maturities and liquidity, could influence the yield curve on different assets due to assets 
being imperfect substitutes.  
11 The portfolio gets exposed to duration risk as investors sell their assets. Interest rate sensitivity is created 
between the assets held in the portfolio and the present value of liabilities held on the portfolio. Investors seek to 
shield their liabilities from interest rate fluctuation by searching for assets with similar characteristics and higher 
yields through a process called immunization (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2011, p.528) 
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describe the portfolio rebalancing mechanism that has been explained, where optimal investors 
prefer a certain segment of the yield curve.  
2.5.2  International Signaling Effect 
The international signaling channel is the second mechanism through which UMP 
announcements exert global financial markets. This channel postulates to the belief that 
monetary policy announcements transmit vital information regarding the commitment of a 
central bank to a given direction of the policy rate including its outlook of the economic 
situation (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Bauer and Neely, 2014; Bauer and Rudebusch, 
2014). It captures the variations in the expected direction of future short term interest rates that 
arise from monetary policy announcements that might relay new information about the central 
bank’s reaction function and the global economic outlook. The signalling channel depends and 
operates on the standard expectation hypothesis concerning the relation between long term 
interest rates and short term rates. A policy announcement in an advanced economy can signal 
to market participants that the central banks across borders will subsequently implement similar 
policies, hence, driving up assets prices through the signalling channel as discussed in Chen et 
al. (2012). Other scholars also find that central banks are able to influence the economy through 
communication of future policy such as forward guidance which affects market expectations12. 
The new announcement may also signal the change in the assessment of global risk and change 
in the view of the global economic outlook by the central bank.  
Through the signalling channel, domestic asset prices across borders adjust their prices 
as UMP is announced by foreign central banks. Different asset classes have different responses 
to foreign UMP announcements and largely depends on the interpretation of the announcement 
i.e. whether it is optimistic or pessimistic. For equities, a pessimistic interpretation of the 
announcement of UMP in view of a downgrade in the economic outlook negatively affects the 
expected earnings. Domestic equity prices are a function of expected earnings, therefore, the 
decline in expected earnings weighs on domestic share prices. As discussed in Chen et al. 
(2012) and Caruana (2012), domestic asset prices can be driven up by formulating comparable 
policies as those implemented in foreign economies. Such an action can compensate the fall in 
share prices though a positive change lower than expected rates of domestic policy. For 
exchange rates, the direction of the domestic currency depends on the currency risk. If the 
                                                          
12 The ability to stabilize expectations using inflation expectations is discussed in Welsh (2009). The ability of a 
central bank to commit to its promise of future inflation under inflation targeting framework can reduce a crisis 
at zero lower bound. The commitment signals to the market participants that it is willing to keep monetary policy 
accommodative and thereby generate an increase in inflation expectations.  
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domestic currency is a safe heaven, UMP announcements that indicate a negative economic 
outlook appreciate the domestic currency as market participants convert foreign currency to 
local currency. This appreciation can be dampened as domestic central banks adjust their pull 
factors in response to foreign announcements. If the currency is not a safe heaven, the degree 
of change is not expected to be pronounced when there is a negative global economic outlook. 
2.5.3    International Liquidity Channel 
The international liquidity channel focuses on the fact that the sale of assets by the private 
sector increases the level of liquidity to the private sector and reduces the amount of liquidity 
held by the counterparty (Korniyenko and Loukoianova, 2015). Rationale investors will seek 
a broad spectrum of assets both domestically and internationally in order to invest the proceeds 
from the sale of assets. Long term investors will search for similar assets in order to mitigate 
duration risk by matching their long term liabilities and long term assets. Short term investors 
will increase their risk appetite and invest in other international markets that offer higher yields. 
The tapping of rational investors into the international market exposes them to currency risk 
which differs in various markets. The degree to which asset prices react is a function of the risk 
premium, hence, the change in asset prices domestically differs from the change in assets prices 
on the international market due to the extra risk investors have to bear.       
 
2.5.4    Exchange Rate Channel 
Both foreign conventional monetary policy announcements and UMP announcements can have 
a significant impact on domestic financial asset prices through an exchange rate channel. An 
accommodative monetary policy by a foreign central bank induces a depreciation of the 
nominal spot exchange rate in the domestic economy while the domestic currency appreciates 
(Krugman et al., 2011)13. The domestic monetary policy response to announced foreign 
monetary policy depends on the ability of the domestic Central bank to use alternative policy 
instruments such as debt swaps, foreign exchange intervention14. Taylor (2001) argues that the 
temporal disturbance of exchange rate resulting in the depreciation of the domestic currency 
does not affect interest rates. This is because temporal disturbances do not have a significant 
                                                          
13 This corresponds to the notion of the Mundell Fleming model which is an extension of the IS – LM model. 
Advanced economies and emerging markets are open to trade amongst each other, hence, monetary policy 
announcements in one country will lead to a spillover effects in another country linked to the announcement 
origin. The model facilitates the assessment of monetary policy in a flexible and fixed exchange rate regime. It is 
worth noting that the LM curve is backward looking and has been replaced by the forward looking TR curve 
which is now used for the analysis of monetary policy when interest rates are above the zero lower bound. 
14 Ho and McCauley (2003) provide some of the unconventional policy instruments that can be used in response 
to foreign monetary policy announcement.  
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effect on the market expectations of inflation and a central bank that has an inflation targeting 
regime include the volatility of its currency as it formulates policy15.  
As the domestic spot exchange rate appreciates, it results in the enhancement of restrictive 
monetary conditions. A foreign UMP announcement will have different effects on asset prices 
when monetary conditions are restrictive. For equities that have an exposure or operations in 
foreign markets, an appreciation of the domestic currency against its major trading currencies 
(or currency in which its foreign operation denominated) reduces a firm’s expected earnings. 
The share price is a function of future dividend estimates, growth and the required rate of return, 
hence, a reduction in a firm’s expected earnings has a negative impact on the share price. There 
are possibly further offsetting effects for the assets considered. An appreciation of the domestic 
spot exchange rate means that the price of foreign assets decreases relative to similar or 
comparable assets locally. On the other hand, if rational investor’s sentiments are that the local 
currency will further appreciate overtime, it implies that domestic assets will provide currency 
appreciation induced valuation gains. This makes foreign assets less attractive relative to 
domestic assets. 
2.5.5    Investor Sentiments 
Investor sentiment is an ambiguous concept that has no standard measure, hence, different 
investor estimates are captured by different proxies. Baker and Wurgler (2006) develop a raw 
sentiment index which is used as a proxy for measuring sentiments as a first principle of other 
indices. UMP announcements may drive prices either upwards when optimistic or downwards 
when pessimistic depending on how market participants react. Lutz (2015) studies the effects 
of monetary policy before and after the crisis on investor sentiments and finds that an 
unexpected drop in the FED’s funds rate during conventional monetary policy announcements 
has a positive impact on investor sentiments which is the same effect of UMP announcements 
on economic sentiments16. The findings are in line with Kurov (2010) who suggests that US 
investor sentiments is substantially affected by monetary policy announcements of the FED. 
There is a negative impact short term effect which becomes positive in the long term which is 
at odds with earlier findings and argue that it is due to the difference in the UMPs implemented 
                                                          
15 Continuously and heavily reacting to exchange rate volatility raises the risk of changing the objective reaction 
function. For countries that are inflation targeting, it means that the Central bank’s stop focusing on the inflation 
target making the exchange rate the de facto anchor for policy.  
16 A surprise announcement of a reduction of the FED’s funds rate by 50 basis points in Baker and Wurgler (2006, 
2007) causes a 1.5 increase in standard deviation of the stock market index after 2 years. 
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by the different central banks after the crisis. Furthermore, they find sentiment spillover effects 
to both advanced economies and EMEs which form part of our focus of study. 
Investor sentiments have the ability to exert irregular impact on equity returns. 
Following the recovery from the financial crisis, there have been optimistic sentiments in 
advanced economies which have been transmitted to EMEs as it was witnessed from the 
increase in equity prices until 2015. After 2015, EMEs experienced capital out flows as oil 
prices declined and fluctuations in other macro-economic variables has left investors with 
pessimistic sentiments over their direction. Individual stock performance and the expected 
returns on equity across different boarders can be explained by investor sentiments. 
2.6       Capital Flows from Advanced Economies to Emerging Markets 
The aftermath of the financial crisis had been preceded with trade imbalances and capital flows 
such as portfolio debt, portfolio equity, banking flows and foreign direct investments. Obstfeld 
(2012) finds that most capital flows occur between advanced economies in absolute terms while 
they play a significant role in EME by stabilizing financial markets which are often exposed to 
fluctuations in their foreign currency reserves. The push-pull framework has been instrumental 
in explaining movement of capital flows during the financial crisis and during the aftermath. It 
is important to highlight that this research focuses on gross capital flows which are different 
from net capital flows. Gross capital flows encompass domestic investments by foreigners or 
locals abroad and foreign investments by residents. They involve movement of capital in two 
ways as central banks adjust their monetary policy which makes it relevant for this research. 
The two way capital flows of lending, international investments and financial intermediation 
attribute to a country’s integration into global financial markets as it was found in Borio and 
Disyatat (2011).  
In the past couple of years, the implementation of UMP in advanced economies has led 
to equity and bond flows to EMEs. There is growing consensus among several scholars (See 
Shin & Bruno, 2013; Rey, 2013) on the role U.S monetary policy has played in capital inflows 
to EME in an effort to mitigate global risk and supply liquidity. Anaya, Hachula and 
Offermanns (2017) find that accommodative policy in the US has a significant impact on 
capital flows to EME for almost two quarters which is followed by continuous shifts in real 
and financial variables in EMEs.  Policy makers among emerging market economies have 
expressed concern on rising capital inflows not backed by fundamentals which they caution 
may raise bubbles and other negative effects. Eichengreen, Rajan and Prasad (2011) propose 
that more consideration should be put on the spillover effects during the formulation of 
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monetary policy frameworks. The proposition and conclusion is at odds with Svensson (2001) 
who argues that the U.S Federal Reserve acts within its mandate of maximum employment and 
price stability. Responsibility lies within the authorities across borders of recipient EME’s 
monetary policy makers. A flexible exchange rate regime acts as a buffer during periods when 
there are global imbalances enabling emerging market economies to respond appropriately to 
changes in interest rates and other macro-economic variables across the globe. Other countries 
endeavor to stabilize their currency or peg their currency to the U.S dollar or other advanced 
economy currency such as the euro and also implement comparable accommodative monetary 
policy17. A comparable monetary policy may be unsustainable and can overheat the economy 
with negative effects18. 
2.7       Summary 
The literature gives a background on how transparency of monetary policy announcements has 
evolved over the years. It further explains the channels through which monetary policy affects 
asset prices. Due to the financial and trade linkages that exist between advanced economies 
and emerging markets, it is expected that monetary policy announcements in one country will 
cause a spillover effect and later a spillback effect through a feedback mechanism from the 
recipient country. This provides an interesting area of study because existing literature mainly 
focuses on advanced economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 This corresponds to the findings of Taylor (2013); Chen et al. (2012); Caruana (2012) as they explain the impact 
of monetary policy in a foreign economy and its transmission to the domestic economy through the signaling 
channel. They argue that the domestic economy will implement comparable policy thereby driving up asset prices 
in the domestic economy. 
 
18 The Swiss Central bank introduced a peg on its currency in September 2011 to protect it from appreciation as 
investor’s found it to be a safe haven compared to the dollar or the euro. The Swiss franc was pegged at 1.20 per 
euro which was scrapped off after 3 years in 2015. This drove down Swiss asset prices. The Swiss central bank 
attempted to stabilize its currency but found the move to be unsustainable.   
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CHAPTER 3 
                     DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  The Data 
The data comprises asset prices from fifteen EME across the globe. The first 
consideration that was put in place is the existence of trade and financial linkages that exists 
amongst different countries across the globe. Bernard & Ebner (2017) use US long term 
government bond yields to determine evidence on the importance of cross border financial 
linkages which they found to covary positively with Swiss bond yields. The second factor that 
was considered was the type of exchange rate regime used in the EME. Like other studies on 
exchange rate regimes (Fischer, 2001), selection of countries shall be based on the Official 
classification of exchange rate regimes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). IMF 
countries are self-identified using the official classification. Due to capital flows from advanced 
economies to EMEs that surged after the crisis of 2008, selection of sustainable currency 
regimes was vital in selecting the countries19. Therefore, the EME were selected from four 
categories which are: free floating, managed exchange rate or residual, floating and stabilized 
arrangement. The research lastly considered countries that have sufficient financial and 
economic data. The sample of EME selected resembles other studies on EME (Bowman et al., 
2015; Bernhard & Ebner, 2017). 
The research focuses on daily data which makes it easier to zero in on the window 
period to which UMP announcements are the only information that are being transmitted.  
The research focuses on three types of asset classes i.e. equity prices, bonds, and 
currencies. In order to obtain unbiased results from the selection of assets, using the emerging 
market indexes was considered appropriate to represent the market. The main EM equity 
indexes; bilateral nominal EM exchange rates versus U.S dollar, Japanese yen, British pound 
and the Euro; yields on local currency denominated bond index20. All asset prices and yields 
will be extracted from the Bloomberg terminal. 
 
                                                          
19  Unsustainable exchange rate regimes have historically been linked to having been one of the factors that 
have caused a series of economic crisis such as the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in 1992, Mexican Peso crisis, 
1994 – 1995 and the East Asian crisis 1997-1998.  
20  Given the expected growth in emerging markets, we collect asset prices data in the local currencies in 
order to give investors and prospective investors a view of how local asset prices are affected by Unconventional 
Monetary Policy as they take positions in different asset classes. See Ojah (1999) for an example of studies that 
used foreign currencies.  
  
 
 
 
Page | 28 
 
Table 3.1: List of selected Emerging market countries  
  MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK 
EXCHANGE RATE 
REGIME 
Monetary Aggregate 
Target 
Inflation Targeting     Other 
Stabilised Arrangements Republic of 
Czechoslovakia 
Nigeria   
Other Managed China   Pakistan 
      
 
      
 
Floating   Hungary Kenya 
    Brazil   
    South Africa   
    Thailand   
    Turkey   
    South Korea   
    Peru   
    
 
  
Free Floating   Mexico   
    Poland   
    Chile   
    
 
  
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 2016. 
 
 
 
 
3.2  Outline of Methodology 
The research shall be conducted in three steps in order to achieve the research 
objectives. 
 
3.2.1  Determination of market Expectation 
The study first gathers UMP announcements to determine the extent to which market 
participants anticipate the content of the announcements in order to examine the first objective. 
A relatively larger number of announcements that covers a period of seven years beginning 
from 2009 eliminates restrictions of interpretations that is faced by earlier studies on UMP 
announcements. However, this does not mean all announcements are surprising to market 
participants. Market participants have improved their ability to anticipate UMP announcements 
after the crisis. Two examples of surprise UMP announcements are: the announcement by the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to end the Large Scale Asset Purchase (LASP) 
earlier than anticipated on 19th June, 2013; the announcements to purchase British gilts and 
U.S Treasuries in March 2009 by the FOMC and BOE. 
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We use two day movement in the yields of 10 year government bond futures as a proxy 
for the extent to which markets participants anticipate the UMP announcements. The change 
in the yields are compared to the one day change in the yields in order prove the findings of 
Joyce et al. (2012). In order to ensure comparability amongst different countries, we 
standardise the surprise measure using standard deviation as stated in equation (3.1). This will 
allow us to have a standard proxy despite the difference in the bond futures contracts. A good 
proxy should have larger deviations on the days that have been selected as announcement dates 
from our event set. A positive change in the yields indicates that the UMP is restrictive while 
a negative change indicates an expansionary monetary policy. Due to the inverse relationship 
that exists between bond yields and bond prices, restrictive UMP will lead to a drop in the bond 
prices while accommodative UMP will result in the increase of bond prices. 
     
           ∆St = ft10y – f10yt-1                    (3.1) 
            σ∆ft 
There is an important caveat to this way of measuring surprises as it does not 
decompose the effects of specific policies on asset prices. Most of the announcements that have 
been made after the crisis contain various policies making it difficult to separate the effect. 
 
3.2.2  The Fixed Effects Model 
Having established a surprise measure, we estimate, the spill over effects of UMP on 
EME asset prices. Let yit denote the asset price in the ith country in the tth time period described 
by equation 
                  yit = α + βSit + Ɛit                          i = 1, … , N;  t = 1, . . . , T            (3.2) 
Where α is the intercept, Sit represents a surprise component and Ɛit represents a random error 
term. The error term Ɛit decomposed into a country specific effect, µt, and a disturbance term, 
υit, that varies over time and countries which we describe in equation 
    Ɛit = µt + υit                                            (3.3) 
So we substitute equation (3.3) into equation (3.2) and rewrite it as: 
                yit = α + βSit + µt + υit                     (3.4) 
The model (3.4) could be estimated using dummy variables using a Least Dummy 
Variable Approach.  
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            yit = βSit + µ1d1t + µ2d2t + µ3d3t + . . . + µtdTt + υit                                                    (3.5) 
Where d1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 on the day of the announcement and 0 
on days without announcements. In order to estimate the parameters β, α and µ of interest we 
use OLS. An assumption that is considered is that, there is no correlation between the surprise 
component Sit and the unobserved effect µt in order to obtain a consistent estimator β. Another 
assumption that is considered is that, the intercepts vary over time but assume that they remain 
the same across countries at each given point in time. The first difference operator is applied 
to equation (3.4) in order for the model to explain the changes in yit and not the level of yit. 
Therefore, we subtract the asset price in period t1 from the price of t3 in country i. 
yit3 = (β0 + α0) + β1Sit3 + µzt3 + υit3                         t = 3 
yit = β0 + β1Sit + µzt + υit                            t = 1 
yit3 - yit = (β0 + α0 - β0) + β1 (Sit3 - Sit) + µ(zt3 - zt) + (υit3 - υit) 
∆yit = α0 + β1∆Sit + µzt + υit                                           (3.6) 
We allow variation of intercepts amongst the countries by introducing a dummy variable in 
model (3.6). The model shall only include one dummy variable in order to avoid the dummy 
variable trap (i.e. Perfect collinearity). Therefore, we choose the announcement date as the 
baseline date which will take the value of one on the day of the announcement and zero 
otherwise. Hence, we analyse the impact of UMP announcements on EME asset prices using 
the model:  
 
                                 ∆yit = α + β∆Sit.dt, events + µzt + υit                  (3.7) 
         ∆yit = α + β∆St + µzt + υit                            (3.8) 
                     ∆yit = α + β dt, events + µzt + υit                 (3.9) 
 
The response variable ∆yit in equation (3.7) represents the two day movement in EM asset 
prices. Equation (3.8) represents the change in asset prices without considering the days when 
announcements are made. Equation (3.9), indicates the change in asset prices including the 
announcement day but it excludes the surprise, the extent to which market participants 
anticipates the content of the news. A two day window period shall be used as in Joyce et al. 
(2012). A longer period may incorporate other factors driving the movement in prices while 
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shorter period may miss the reaction in the change in the price. The window shall be measured 
as the change in the closing price the day before (t – 1) the announcement and the closing price 
the day after the announcement (t +1). 
 
∆St represents a quantitative estimate of the UMP surprise by market participants, the degree 
to which it differs from expectations by the market participants. The 10 year future bond yields 
are used as a proxy to measure the surprise two day window period.  
dt, events is a dummy variable that takes the value of zero on days that have no announcements 
and takes the value of one on days that have announcements. The control variables are denoted 
by zt which comprises the one day lagged change in the VIX, commodity price index and the 
US unemployment (non-farm payroll). We estimate the equations by OLS taking 
heteroscedasticity into consideration based on White (1980).  
 
3.2.3  Selection of UMP announcements 
This will involve, a robust identification of UMP shocks that are a result of UMP. Faust et al. 
(2007) propose that the timing of when the policy is announced must be pinned down.  The 
difference in the time zones of the four advanced Central banks under study must be considered. 
The selected EME are equally picked from different time zones. An announcement made by 
the BOJ will affect EME asset prices on the same day. Announcements made by the ECB and 
BOE will affect asset prices in Europe, Africa and America on the same day. Announcements 
made by the ECB and BOE will affect asset prices in Europe, Africa and America on the same 
day, while asset prices in Asia will only be affected if the markets are open at the time of the 
announcements otherwise they will only be affected the following day. Announcements made 
by FED affect EME asset prices in America on the same day, while asset prices in Africa, 
Europe and Asia are affected on the following day due to trading hours, but they can affect 
asset prices on the same day in certain parts of Europe and Africa if the announcement is made 
before 10.30am eastern time21.  
The selection UMP announcements starts from 2nd January, 2009 which differs from 
other studies (Glick and Leduc, 2012) which begin from the last quarter of 2008, in order to 
avoid the period when conventional policy was still being implemented and future use of UMP 
was being signalled.  
                                                          
21 This is based on the assumption that the content of the announcements is not anticipated by market 
participants and the general public. 
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Romer and Romer (1989) outline a narrative approach which shall be relied on to identify 
policy shocks. This approach will involve constructing a series of announcements and the 
responses it evoked. A list a of UMP announcements that shall be considered for the purpose 
of this research is indicated in the Appendix and states the dates the announcements are made 
which is vital for our analysis. Announcements shall be extracted from media conferences, 
press releases and speeches of governors. Some of the announcements made may be anticipated 
by market participants while others may not which is our area of interest. 
Having collected the UMP announcements, the study focuses on announcements that 
aim at restoring liquidity as the purpose of the UMP announcements after the crisis has been 
to restore monetary and macro-economic stability. 
The second set of announcements that shall be considered is announcements that do not 
confirm what was previously stated in earlier meetings because they are not anticipated by 
market participants. This approach differs from Rogers et al. (2014), who use both anticipated 
and unexpected announcements to conduct their analysis on exchange rates. The selected 
approach enables us to separate the noise that may be contained in announcements that may 
not contain any news which is capable of weakening identification. Theoretically, it is possible 
to argue that our approach excludes the situation were the central bank had earlier indicated 
that intentions to make changes but does not do so due to certain factors such as targets not 
being consistent. This argument is vital though after the crisis, policy makers have endeavoured 
to communicate in advance in order anchor the expectation of market participants. 
 
3.3  Assessment of Investor Sentiment 
In order to assess the effects on investor sentiments after the financial crisis, we employ an 
event study methodology as structured in Glick and Reduc (2012) and Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011). The event study allows us to assess changes in UMP announced by 
the central banks and account for the effects. 
Investor sentiments can be defined as the propensity to speculate which drives or dampens 
demands for risky or riskless investments. In this study, we select different types of sentiment 
indicators because there is no measure of sentiment that is completely accurate. Different 
sentiment indicators capture different investor behaviour. Therefore, we select the consumer 
sentiment index, US investor sentiment index and the volatility index (VIX). 
The VIX is a forward looking indicator which captures the market’s view of the future 
volatility of an underlying asset at different investment horizons. Consumer sentiment index is 
a proxy that is used to estimate consumer expectations on the economy while the US investor 
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sentiment index captures the expectation of individual investors on the direction of the stock 
market. 
 
3.4  Summary 
In conclusion, this is how the impact of UMP announcements on emerging market asset prices 
will be assessed. Announcements were first selected for a period of seven years and determined 
the extent to which market participant expected the content of the announcements. A regression 
was later performed on the data. The study used Stata software to perform the regression 
analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4 
              RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics on two day changes in asset prices 
We begin our analysis by assessing the two day changes in the asset prices of the 15 selected 
EME asset prices. Table 4.1 represents the two day returns on the asset prices. The descriptive 
statistics indicate that bonds have had a higher two day change in the price compared to equities 
except for Thailand which recorded a maximum return of 13.14 on a two day period and a 
minimum of -10.15 on a two day period. In absolute terms, Nigeria, Hungary, Kenya, Mexico, 
South Korea, Chile, Poland and Czechoslovakia bonds recorded higher two days averages than 
equities over the sample period. For the same period, equities in South Africa, Pakistan, China, 
Peru, Thailand, Brazil and Turkey recorded higher two day returns than bonds in absolute 
terms.  
In terms of currency, the results indicate that EMEs local currencies all had a maximum 
two day return against the Japanese Yen except Nigeria and Mexico which had their maximum 
return against the British pound. Similarly, all EME local currencies had their minimum two 
day return against the pound sterling except Poland, South Africa and Hungary which had 
minimum returns against the Japanese Yen. Furthermore, the results show that during the 
sample period Czechoslovakia, Poland, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, Kenya, Turkey, South 
Africa, Nigeria and Hungary local currencies gained on average in absolute terms against the 
U.S dollar while the Chinese yuan had the highest mean during the period against the yen, the 
South Korean won and Pakistani rupee gained against the pound sterling and the Thai baht 
against the euro. Additionally, the results indicate stronger deviations of EME local currencies 
against the Yen except the Kenyan shilling and Pakistani rupee which had stronger deviations 
against the pound sterling. 
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Table 4.1: Country descriptive statistics of two day changes in asset prices 
        Asset Price     
Country Statistic Bond Equity JPY USD EUR GBP 
Czech Mean -0.23469 0.06442 0.006507 0.027442 0.00078 0.01031 
  Std.Dev 16.2568 1.763226 1.280003 1.078834 0.483427 0.945924 
  Min -239.79 -12.3409 -6.55795 -4.91714 -3.35223 -8.23782 
  Max 219.7225 9.02742 8.425622 5.560978 4.481077 5.18984 
Pakistan Mean -0.03623 0.137978 -0.0191 0.021481 -0.05714 -0.06686 
  Std.Dev 1.616634 1.246657 0.937605 0.26542 0.867285 0.961209 
  Min -5.95084 -6.20589 -4.52428 -1.50987 -3.67928 -11.7808 
  Max 25.74099 5.638823 5.845629 2.200874 5.026307 3.527045 
Poland Mean 0.159493 0.072636 -0.00143 0.027365 0.0042 0.026185 
  Std.Dev 29.3999 1.66691 1.601447 1.372722 0.865876 1.145061 
  Min -346.574 -10.1859 -8.57022 -6.44471 -5.18799 -5.55438 
  Max 352.6361 7.98213 11.39358 7.529521 5.332866 7.468525 
China Mean 0.034031 0.059089 -0.0376 0.020768 -0.0224 -0.03125 
  Std.Dev 1.319038 2.316533 0.931422 0.224792 0.751979 0.823206 
  Min -7.40704 -16.8107 -4.67301 -1.19507 -2.874 -10.4335 
  Max 12.30445 10.0453 5.059869 2.796419 4.367105 4.083406 
Chile Mean -0.07288 -0.00235 0.028261 0.066552 0.023662 0.022454 
  Std. Dev 0.980423 1.161475 1.191139 0.84471 1.013183 1.053706 
  Min -6.02779 -4.23775 -3.95442 -2.96197 -4.0611 -9.88877 
  Max 7.380496 4.871331 6.376296 2.976559 5.202985 4.221124 
South 
Korea Mean -0.15802 0.005226 0.00192 0.035688 -0.03974 -0.04823 
  Std.Dev 1.932504 1.012651 1.102407 0.771199 0.882696 0.934961 
  Min -7.38199 -4.52705 -5.23004 -2.61343 -3.94288 -8.42634 
  Max 12.18898 4.345102 6.724548 2.736937 3.894858 4.630437 
Peru Mean 0.012285 0.028979 -0.02599 0.039296 0.008879 -0.00151 
  Std.Dev 1.415996 1.232154 1.017846 0.437611 0.821553 0.866063 
  Min -10.791 -5.85731 -4.76921 -3.14958 -3.5931 -10.4006 
  Max 10.36284 6.843727 5.244388 1.756864 3.556905 3.151771 
Mexico Mean 0.461779 0.033416 0.020676 0.065827 0.029705 0.03469 
  Std.Dev 11.28101 1.300767 1.432296 1.062562 1.121232 1.082231 
  Min -98.9452 -6.93292 -6.20354 -4.01145 -4.78617 -6.775 
  Max 157.6794 5.444076 10.36349 11.59609 10.38521 13.0199 
Thailand Mean -0.08615 0.095373 -0.01469 0.004471 -0.02457 -0.0219 
  Std.Dev 1.76751 1.706308 0.910427 0.404728 0.796434 0.800584 
  Min -8.60681 -10.1594 -5.04451 -2.10299 -3.57774 -11.1096 
  Max 8.804566 13.14337 4.417845 1.5923 3.516312 3.163704 
Brasil Mean -0.01552 0.037195 0.011737 0.034274 0.008745 0.017396 
  Std.Dev 2.955421 2.070001 1.689929 1.364243 1.337845 1.375655 
  Min -14.72 -8.17624 -8.75869 -6.28572 -9.31117 -10.0879 
  Max 15.53906 8.925827 9.3019 6.848358 7.466349 7.984081 
Kenya Mean 0.094951 -0.06355 0.043688 0.044399 0.00423 -0.03665 
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  Std.Dev 2.281574 1.984482 0.971652 0.331624 0.91237 1.070088 
  Min -11.9698 -8.01495 -4.00074 -1.72121 -2.92075 -11.4797 
  Max 15.52387 7.841833 4.533263 1.651224 3.547969 3.310874 
Turkey Mean 0.027222 0.10006 0.05767 0.079836 0.054189 0.063377 
  Std.Dev 5.029076 2.087114 1.402637 1.031751 1.021428 1.079218 
  Min -33.3348 -12.6367 -7.64238 -4.42061 -4.03621 -8.73671 
  Max 45.95323 8.100307 9.260293 5.48477 5.63362 5.605073 
South  Mean 0.018519 0.080701 0.014477 0.039931 0.013626 0.022437 
Africa Std.Dev 1.306965 1.491828 1.713048 1.455378 1.326367 1.358001 
  Min -8.47846 -6.7524 -7.31469 -6.26982 -6.77385 -7.29878 
  Max 16.18717 7.207296 11.00623 9.055079 7.303603 8.298331 
Nigeria Mean 0.040884 -0.0143 0.07219 0.079271 0.053073 0.062794 
  Std.Dev 2.475392 1.825131 1.842023 1.353159 1.673377 1.638478 
  Min -16.2789 -9.80594 -9.32352 -5.24686 -9.13421 -12.2346 
  Max 35.85529 11.79866 35.13979 35.74284 36.06465 38.30755 
Hungary Mean -0.18853 0.08955 0.018937 0.041013 0.014844 0.024082 
  Std.Dev 3.517668 2.029294 1.622997 1.402984 0.876307 1.210135 
  Min -18.5752 -9.96052 -7.31701 -6.13641 -4.5556 -7.231 
  Max 85.56661 9.140016 9.064852 7.052457 4.708587 9.062499 
Source: Author’s calculations from data collected from the Bloomberg Terminal.  
Note: Std Dev stands for standard deviation, Min stands for minimum, Max stands for maximum. Bond represents 
the bond index yields, Equity represents the equity index in the local currency, JPY represents the Japanese yen 
against the local currency, USD represents the United States dollar against the local currency, EUR represents the 
euro against the local currency and GBP represents the pound sterling against the local currency.  
 
4.2  Surprise element of the announcement 
This section of the analysis reports the changes in the 10 year government bond futures prices 
of advanced economies which in this research are the countries announcing UMP. The 10 year 
government bond futures price is used as a proxy to represent the surprise element in the 
announcements that causes the change in the asset prices. Panel 1 of Table 4.2 represents the 
changes in the futures prices on all days that are considered as the sample days. The 10 year 
US government bond futures price has the highest standard deviation while the 10 year UK 
government bond futures price has the highest mean. The high standard deviation indicates the 
expectations of US government bond holders do not have a strong consensus with the 
unconventional monetary policy and other macroeconomic announcements that are made 
hence find the news surprising. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics: Changes in the 10 Year Government Futures Prices 
10 Year Futures Price     UK     US    JP    EUR 
  Panel 1: All Sample days      
Mean 0.005789 -0.003029 0.001667 -0.000287 
Standard Deviation 0.651405 1.552331 1.140655 0.261464 
Observations   2088    2088    2088     2088 
     
Panel 2: One Day Change on 
UMP event days 
    
Mean 0.002298 -0.040299 0.044834 -0.003583 
Standard Deviation 0.070251 0.626207 1.159396 0.27278 
Observations       163      163      163        163 
     
Panel 3: Two Day Change on 
UMP event days 
    
Mean 0.007671396 -0.123162503 0.134480739 -0.013255755 
Standard Deviation 0.136361752 1.086988406 1.179888308 0.113312023 
Observations        163        163         163        163 
     
Panel 4: Non UMP event 
days 
    
Mean 0.006076 0.00346 0.044834 6.08E-05 
Standard Deviation 0.47015 1.596853 1.159396 0.248404 
Observations     1922     1922      1922       1922 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Panel 2 reports the one day change in the 10 year government futures prices. The results 
show that the announcements are less surprising compared to the results obtained in Panel 1. 
Following the Efficient Market Hypothesis, we expect that the futures prices to have factored 
in the announced news in the process of price discovery within a one day period. The research 
considers the two day change in the asset prices, therefore, Panel 3 reports the changes in the 
futures prices over a two day period, i.e. the change in the closing price on the day before the 
announcement is made and the closing price the day after the announcement has been made. 
The results show stronger deviations compared to other panels. This indicates that the days 
selected as event days are unique and contain surprising announcements or reflect some sort of 
news. Joyce et al. (2011) posits that selecting a one day change halves the effects which is 
supported by the results in Panel 3. In addition, central bank decisions are made in closed door 
meetings which involve a voting process at the end were members affirm or negate a decision. 
Hence, we expect the announcements to be surprising.  
This section endeavours to hedge the risk of capturing other announcements if the 
window period is extended longer or capturing an overreaction by market participants if the 
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window period is reduced. In the concluding remarks of their research, Maheshwari & Dhankar 
(2014) find that there is evidence of overreactions in developed markets which in this study 
refers to the markets announcing UMP. The Overreaction Hypothesis (Debondt and Thaler, 
1985) posits that market participants overreact to surprising and dramatic news. Panel 4 
indicates the prices when no UMP announcements were made. However, it must be noted that 
these days contain other news macroeconomic news that may affect asset prices. It must be 
highlighted that the focus of this research is announcements that affect liquidity of the financial 
markets 
Taking the descriptive statistics at face value, the study observes that the high 
deviations in the 10 year Japanese government futures price is passed onto EME currencies. 
From the selected sample of fifteen countries, thirteen EME currencies recorded a maximum 
against the Japanese yen which has been discussed in Section 4.2.  
 
4.3  Expectations of market participants 
It is vital to take into consideration the expectation of bond holders as we analyse the 
movement in the bond prices in order to avoid bias results. Therefore we analyse the intentions 
of the Central banks in announcing UMP and compare them with the perception of market 
participants. Initially, we analyse the expectations of bond holders of local currency of the 
announcing Central banks and compare it with the intention of the central bank which is 
represented in Table 4.3. From the selected announcements in our study, the Federal Reserve 
made the most accommodative UMP announcements relative to other central banks during the 
period of study. There were more US government bond holders who thought restrictive policy 
would be announced when expansionary monetary policy was being announced. When the 
Federal Reserve made restrictive UMP announcements, 67% of bonder holders expected the 
announcements to be made.  
The results indicate that the BOE made more neutral UMP announcements, i.e. they 
maintained their policies for longer periods without making adjustments to monetary policy. 
The results indicate divided perception among UK government bond holders. 50% of UK 
government bond holders’ perception did not have a consensus with the intention of the BOE 
when both UMP was both restrictive and when it was maintained. 
The results further indicate that there was more uncertainty among Euro bond holders 
when the ECB made restrictive UMP announcements. From the six restrictive announcements 
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made by the ECB, the statistics show that the bond holders perceived five of the announcements 
to be accommodative. This uncertainty was a result of the Euro zone debt crisis. In an effort to 
save the Euro area, the ECB president (Mario Draghi) pledged to do “whatever it takes” during 
a speech in July 2012 which began to give market participants more confidence in the Euro 
zone asset prices. Table 4.3 lastly indicates that there was stronger consensus between Japanese 
government bond holders and the BOJ when accommodative UMP announcements were made. 
 
Table 4.3: Announcing central bank’s intention & market perception of local currency 
denominated bond holders 
 
ECB UMP ANNOUNCEMENTS: Central Bank's Intention & Market Perception of Euro Bond 
holders 
Intention Accommodative    Neutral    Restrictive Consensus 
Perception          Restrictive 3 1 1 1 
                          Expansionary 4 2 5 4 
                                    ∑ 7 3 6 5 
     
BOE UMP ANNOUNCEMENTS: Central Bank's Intention & Market Perception UK Govt Bond 
holders 
Intention Accommodative    Neutral    Restrictive Consensus 
Perception          Restrictive 2 3 1 1 
                          Expansionary 4 3 1 4 
                                    ∑ 6 6 2 5 
     
BOJ UMP ANNOUNCEMENTS: Central Bank's Intention & Market Perception BOJ Govt Bond 
Holders 
Intention Accommodative    Neutral    Restrictive Consensus 
Perception           Restrictive 2 0 0 0 
                          Expansionary 7 1 1 7 
                                    ∑ 9 1 1 7 
     
FED UMP ANNOUNCEMENTS: Central Bank's Intention & Market Perception US Govt Bond 
Holders 
Intention Accommodative    Neutral    Restrictive Consensus 
Perception          Restrictive 6 2 4 3 
                          Expansionary 5 1 2 5 
                                    ∑ 11 3 6 8 
Source: Author’s own analysis. 
Note: Table 4.3 represents the UMP announcements made by the four Central banks and their intentions as they 
make the policy announcements. An accommodative intention refers to an announcement to expand the money 
supply in order to boost economic growth. A restrictive intention refers to an announcement to reduce money 
supply in order to restrict economic growth. Neutral intention refers an announcement that keeps monetary policy 
the same confirming or repeating policy that was stated during a previous meeting, conference, speech or 
publication. Consensus refers to the ability of market participants to anchor their expectations towards the 
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intention of the Central bank. Perception indicates the market participants’ expectations. The perception relies on 
the change in the 10 year yield curve explained in Chapter 3 (i.e. Positive yield change = Restrictive policy, 
Negative yield change = Expansionary policy).  
 
 
The analysis on market expectation of bond holders continues by considering the 
perception of holders of other foreign government (i.e. central banks not announcing 
unconventional monetary policy) bond holders. Recall that the portfolio rebalancing channel is 
a transmission mechanism that affects the financial markets as was discussed in Chapter 2. 
Therefore, when investors hold a portfolio of different bonds, they will continuously adjust 
their portfolio in order to ensure that it remains optimal. Considering the different SWAP 
facilities that were made amongst the four major Central banks in order to provide lines of 
liquidity after the financial crisis, an announcement of UMP by a Central bank is expected to 
have an impact on a portfolio of foreign currency denominated bonds. Swap facilities were also 
provided in the last year of the sample period amongst the major central banks in an effort to 
provide liquidity in the market during the Brexit vote. 
Therefore, Table 4.4 represents the announcing central bank’s intention and compares 
it to the perception of bond holders of foreign denomination. The results indicate that when the 
BOJ made restrictive UMP announcements, market participants did not expect the 
announcements. There was a stronger consensus between the FED and foreign government 
bond holders when UMP announcements were made. Relative to other central banks, the BOE 
had a weak consensus with foreign denominated government bond holders. The results indicate 
that 69% of foreign government bond holders did not expect the ECB UMP to be restrictive 
which is similar to holders of Euro government bond holders in Table 4.3. It can be depicted 
from Table 4.4 that, whenever the four central banks maintained their policy, most foreign 
denominated currency holders had a perception that the announcing central bank was 
restricting its UMP. Table 4.4 further depicts that whenever Central banks made expansionary 
UMP announcements more foreign government bond holders expected the announcements to 
be expansionary expect for announcements made by the BOE which showed eleven out of the 
eighteen announcements were expected to be restrictive. 
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Table 4.4 Announcing central bank’s intention & market perception of foreign 
denominated bond holders. 
BOJ UMP ANNOUNCEMENT:  Central Bank's Intention & Market Perception of Other Bond 
Holder's 
Intention Accommodative    Neutral    Restrictive Consensus 
Perception    Contractionary 10 3 0 0 
                      Expansionary 17 0 3 15 
                               ∑ 27 3 3 15 
          
ECB UMP ANNOUNCEMENT:  Central Bank's Intention & Market Perception of Other Bond 
Holder's 
Intention Accommodative    Neutral    Restrictive Consensus 
Perception       Contractionary 6 5 5 8 
                          Expansionary 15 1 11 15 
                                    ∑ 21 6 16 16 
          
FED UMP ANNOUNCEMENT:  Central Bank's Intention & Market Perception of Other Bond 
Holder's 
Intention Accommodative    Neutral    Restrictive Consensus 
Perception        Contractionary 12 6 6 7 
                          Expansionary 21 3 12 21 
                                    ∑ 33 9 18 28 
          
BOE UMP ANNOUNCEMENT:  Central Bank's Intention & Market Perception of Other Bond 
Holder's 
Intention Accommodative    Neutral    Restrictive Consensus 
Perception        Contractionary 11 8 3 2 
                          Expansionary 7 7 3 7 
                                    ∑ 18 15 6 9 
Source: Author’s own analysis 
Note: Table 4.4 takes a different approach from Table 4.3. The study considers the perception of bond holders 
that have positions on bonds in a different currency (foreign currency) from the announcing Central bank’s local 
currency. The meaning of central bank intention and market perception remain the same as in Table 4.3. 
 
4.4  Panel data regression data results 
The regression analysis begins by focussing on emerging market currencies. The tables 4.5, 4.6 
and 4.7 represent the results for equation (3.7). This equation constitutes a dummy variable 
which was obtained by multiplying the surprise element and 1 on days of the announcement, 
while the surprise component is multiplied by 0 on days without an announcement. The results 
indicate that the models fit the data as can be observed from the R statistics. The results of the 
F test for the fixed effect model and probability values indicate that the models are well 
estimated.  
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Table 4.5 currency Panel Data Regression Results for Equation (3.7) 
 JPY USD EUR GBP 
CONST 0.6015854 
(1.356494) 
2.093663 
(1.327518) 
2.034246 
(1.654019) 
2.71166 
(2.358998) 
BOE    21.7934 
(12.86432) 
ECB   -22.88003 
(16.11186) 
 
FED  10.77563 
(7.086711) 
  
BOJ -6.943512 
(0.9035647) 
   
VOL 0.3739794 
(0.0416867) 
2.96094 
(0.4527479) 
5.954603 
(0.42542) 
6.742063 
(0.6954124) 
COMM 0.0329833 
(0.0074713) 
0.4931967 
(0.0943992) 
1.272679 
(0.1095101) 
1.1406 
(0.1137313) 
NON FARM -0.2407635 
(0.0640059) 
-0.4951376 
(0.7222518) 
-4.203936 
(0.7380033) 
-3.77558 
(0.9858134) 
     
Within R² 0.9498 0.7486 0.15 0.7806 
Between R² 0.9285 0.8214 0.8211 0.8212 
Overall R² 0.944 0.5886 0.7241 0.6771 
F Stat 1.06 26.27 25.47 21.9 
corr(u_i, Xb) 0.1414 0.3709 0.3927 0.4235 
Prob 0.3984 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
The regression results begin by focussing on emerging market currencies. Table 4.5 represents 
the results for equation (3.7). In order to avoid the dummy trap and multi collinearity, the 
dummy variables were separated. FED announcements and BOE announcements are positive 
and statistically significant at 5 % level while ECB and BOJ announcements are negative and 
statistically significant at 5% level. The results further indicate that there is a significant change 
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in the currencies when announcements are made relative to other assets as can be observed 
from the higher coefficients.  
Emerging market economies that have a wide budget deficit and rely on financing from 
advanced economies or have debt denominated in foreign currency are more exposed to capital 
flow reversals whenever UMP announcements are made. The results also show that the non-
farm payroll significantly affects the emerging market currencies over the two day window 
period.  
Table 4.6: Equity Panel Data Regression Results for Equation (3.7) 
 EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY EQUITY 
CONST 1.07E+07 
0.01693383 
2.39E+07 
0.01253289 
9.0999915 
2.179004 
2.67E+07 
896169.6 
BOE    -3.450547 
3.96880.6 
ECB   -2.57497 
1.138264 
 
FED  9.203272 
5.541799 
  
BOJ 2.956159 
1.127968 
   
VOL 0.04756443 
0.005203972 
0.02932009 
0.003540483 
0.04034017 
0.003005489 
0.06742063 
0.000695412 
COMM 0.005039925 
0.08972891 
0.005098098 
0.007477165 
0.00724542 
0.008948751 
0.005719876 
0.006337353 
NON FARM -0.2592143 
0.0858828 
-0.9645207 
0.6067645 
-0.3014438 
0.5004059 
-0.1669267 
0.5341327 
  
Within R² 0.8264 0.8196 0.8236 0.8148 
Between R² 0.9891 0.9891 0.9891 0.9891 
Overall R² 0.8344 0.7122 0.7904 0.741 
F Stat 5.11 18.75 11.92 12.33 
corr(u_i, Xb) 0.5134 0.4488 0.5359 0.4837 
Prob 0.763     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 4.7: Bond Panel Data Regression Results for Equation (3.7) 
BOND  BOND  BOND  BOND  BOND 
CONST 0.376581 
(0.06593165) 
0.4903127 
(0.04883876) 
0.3830232 
(0.0444594) 
0.4297408 
(0.04649632) 
BOE    -0.08045472 
(0.02535583) 
ECB   0.08757728 
(0.04330805) 
 
FED  0.1241017 
(0.01739596) 
  
BOJ -0.04211362 
(0.04391728) 
   
VOL 0.0154214 
(0.0202616) 
-0.0367572 
(0.0111137) 
0.0142949 
(0.0114351) 
-0.0053616 
(0.0137067) 
COMM -0.0021282 
(0.002968) 
-0.0062892 
(0.0022193) 
-0.0009892 
(0.002645) 
-0.0003587 
(0.0022802) 
NON FARM -0.0274868 
(0.0247804) 
0.050834 
(0.0148903) 
-0.0221139 
(0.0132768) 
-0.0055993 
(0.0150182) 
     
Within R² 0.2352 0.47 0.2578 0.2971 
Between R² 0.9255 0.9255 0.9255 0.9255 
Overall R² 0.2402 0.0574 0.228 0.1158 
F Stat 3.85 9.66 6.72 7.61 
corr(u_i, Xb) 0.2509 -0.2283 0.2137 -0.0004 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
The FED and BOJ announcements are positive and statistically significant at 5% level while 
ECB and BOE announcements are negative and statistically significant at 5%. The results 
indicate that the FED announcements have higher impacts on emerging markets equities. This 
shows the concern in the pricing of emerging market equities. Even though Svensson (2001) 
argues that advanced central banks announce policies according to their mandate, it has been 
observed from the higher coefficient that, the FED which spear head accommodative UMP 
after the financial crisis has an effect on equity prices in emerging markets. This has led to an 
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increase in equity prices in emerging markets after the financial crisis which hasn’t been based 
on strong fundamentals but as a result of an increase in liquidity. Hence, as advanced central 
banks begin to reduce their balance sheet sizes, a capital flight is expected from emerging 
market equities.  
 
Table 4.8: Panel Data Regression Results for Equation (3.8) 
 BOND  EQUITY JPY USD EUR GBP 
CONST 0.1381 
(0.0416) 
1.6554 
(1.2144) 
-0.5403 
(0.1322) 
0.5607 
(0.1845) 
0.5470 
(0.2193) 
0.6185 
(0.2507) 
BOE -0.05304 
(0.02678) 
0.3296 
(0.0782) 
-0.0612 
(0.0851) 
0.4953 
(0.1191) 
0.3564 
(0.1411) 
0.2813 
(0.1614) 
ECB -0.0339 
(0.02752) 
-0.5292 
(0.0804) 
0.2285 
(0.8751) 
-0.6916 
(0.1225) 
-0.4828 
(-0.1451) 
-0.7080 
(0.166) 
FED 0.04284 
(0.03241) 
0.8720 
(0.09467) 
-0.4949 
(0.103) 
0.9958 
(0.1442) 
0.8806 
(0.151) 
0.1544 
(0.1955) 
BOJ -0.1652 
(0.01552) 
-0.3781 
(0.04536) 
-0.3571 
(0.0494) 
-0.3805 
(0.06911) 
-0.5000 
(0.08191) 
-0.7627 
(0.09365) 
VOL 0.0136 
(0.09784) 
0.0451 
(0.002858) 
0.0844 
(0.03111) 
0.0444 
(0.04355) 
0.0639 
(0.05161) 
0.0820 
(0.05901) 
COMM 0.0022 
(0.0003709) 
0.0065 
(0.000125) 
0.0014 
(0.01847) 
0.0060 
(0.1476) 
0.0013 
(0.0164) 
0.0014 
(0.2152) 
NON 
FARM 
-0.0721198 
(0.008998) 
0.0257 
(0.002636) 
-0.6121 
(0.09975) 
0.2411 
(0.03547) 
-0.3615 
(0.004359) 
-0.4676 
(0.5167) 
       
Within 
R² 
0.8593  0.9419 0.889 0.885 0.9204 0.8236 
Between 
R² 
0.8212    0.9891 0.9285 0.8214 0.8211 0.8212 
Overall 
R² 
0.8138 0.9622 0.8462 0.8296 0.8492 0.8199 
F Stat 5.85 3.8 4.12 26.02 29.2 16.25 
corr(u_i,
Xb) 
0.5083 0.6519 -0.3893 0.3133 0.1702 0.1703 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Page | 46 
 
Table 4.9: Panel Data Regression Results for Equation (3.9) 
 BOND  EQUITY JPY USD EUR GBP 
CONST -0.0238 
(0.05582) 
-3.2205 
(1.05091) 
0.0174 
(0.009696) 
-0.0389 
(0.1912) 
-0.1816 
(0.2048) 
-0.1108 
(0.263) 
BOE -
0.3643985 
(0.04701) 
-0.3607 
(0.08857) 
-0.0068 
(0.0008174) 
-0.0491 
(0.01612) 
-0.0305 
(0.01721) 
-0.0276 
(0.02216) 
ECB 0.7270 
(0.0935) 
0.4471 
(0.176) 
0.0154 
(0.001624) 
0.1888 
(0.3202) 
0.0601 
(0.03431) 
0.1404 
(0.04406) 
FED 0.1948 
(0.03255) 
0.8490 
(0.06128) 
0.0093 
(0.005651) 
0.1101 
(0.01115) 
0.0956 
(0.01194) 
0.1018 
(0.01534) 
BOJ -0.7688 
(0.08464) 
-1.7280 
(0.1593) 
-0.0043 
(0.00147) 
-0.1568 
(0.02899) 
-0.2420 
(0.03106) 
-0.3913 
(0.03986) 
VOL 0.0001235 
(0.00004) 
0.0081 
(0.000268) 
0.0041 
(0.000247) 
0.0089 
(0.004877) 
0.0012 
(0.005225) 
0.0014 
(0.006706) 
COMM 0.0006626 
(0.00023) 
0.0007 
(0.000794) 
0.0005 
(0.000323) 
0.0078 
(0.000102) 
0.0013 
(0.000952) 
0.0014 
(0.000139) 
NON 
FARM 
0.06869 
(0.05387) 
0.0427 
(0.002421) 
0.0562 
(0.01253) 
0.0462 
(0.02876) 
0.1276 
(0.03452) 
0.1115 
(0.0428) 
       
Within R² 0.7487 0.9694 0.9921 0.9135 0.9511 0.9323 
Between R² 0.9255 0.9891 0.9285 0.8214 0.8211 0.8212 
Overall R² 0.8547  0.982 0.9871 0.8495 0.8679 0.8556 
F Stat 3.35  4.61 5.66 33.38 46.37 42.03 
corr(u_i,Xb) 0.2386 0.1666 0.0003 0.0484 -0.0078 0.0292 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
4.5  Effect on Investor Sentiment 
Lastly, we analyse the effects of UMP surprise announcements on weekly proxies of investor 
sentiments. Unfortunately, we cannot use daily data available because the data with higher 
frequency is limited to dates out of our sample period while the data within our sample dates 
contain structural breaks due to the changes in calculations. As stated earlier we, we use an 
event study to analyse the effects of the surprise announcements. The announcements were 
selected from the different central banks in figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Appendix. This section 
focussed on eight particular announcements of which six are accommodative and two are 
restrictive. 
On 18 December 2013, the FED announced that it would begin reducing (tapering) its 
asset purchases the following month. This marks an important date in monetary policy as this 
was the first date when large scale asset purchases were being reduced by an advanced central 
bank, therefore the outcome was uncertain. Our results on market expectations indicate that 
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there was a positive change in the yield curve which indicates that the markets expected the 
announcements to be restrictive. The sentiment indicators show a drop by 1250 basis points in 
the VIX, a drop by 2607 basis points in the AAIIBEAR, while the bullish investors remained 
optimistic, hence, a rise by 1601 basis points in the AAIIBULL. The Federal Reserve increased 
interest rates for the first time after the financial crisis on the 14th December 2016. Our results 
on market expectations indicate that bond holders were expecting the announcement to be 
made. This announcement resulted in a drop in all investor sentiment indicators in our sample.  
Next, the research analyses the effect of accommodative UMP which shows that there 
was an increase in all investor sentiment indicators. The AAIIBULL Index showed the 
strongest increase in basis points whenever accommodative monetary policy was announced. 
Our results on market expectations show that the bond holders did not expect the announcement 
made by the BOJ to increase asset purchases by ¥5tn. The yields on the 10 year government 
bond futures were positive but still caused an increase in investor sentiments. A similar reaction 
was observed on the 8th December 2011, when the ECB announced a reduction in the reserve 
ratio from 2% to 1%. This measure caused an increase in investor sentiment indicators.  
The research results are consistent with the findings of Lutz (2015) who assess the 
impact of unconventional monetary policy on investor sentiments using an event study but with 
a different sample and frequency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Page | 48 
 
Table 4.10: One week change in basis points the sentiment indexes and central bank 
intention 
Date Central 
Bank 
Intention 
 
AAIIBEAR 
Index                                                   
AAIIBULL 
Index                                                   
VIX Index                                                        DIREXICON
18/03/2009 Accommodative 2974.114 
 
1316.023 
 
1056.875 
 
0           
         
27/10/2009 Accommodative 1848.222 
 
1687.253 
 
2167.944 
 
0           
          
08/12/2011 Accommodative 1392.598 
 
1673.729 
 
14.24419 
 
507.5758           
          
09/05/2013 Accommodative 692.4198 
 
3162.31 
 
202.3346 
 
85.43651           
          
22/11/2013 Accommodative 417.232 
 
3753.998 
 
57.42412 
 
49.07975           
          
18/12/2013 Restrictive -2607.66 
 
1601.349 
 
-1250 
 
196.196           
          
04/08/2016 Accommodative -577.262 
 
503.5247 
 
-404.381 
 
30.50398           
          
14/12/2016 Restrictive -983.607 
 
-11.1957 
 
-622.951 
 
-110.701 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: Central bank intention indicate the direction of monetary policy whether accommodative, neutral or 
restrictive. AAIIBEAR Index represents the American Association of Individual Investors who are bearish. 
AAIIBULL Index represents the American Association of Individual Investors who are bullish. VIX Index 
represents the volatility index. DIREXICON represents the Direxicon All Cap Insider Sentiment Index. Date 
represents the date on which the announcement was made.                                                   
 
4.6  Summary 
As advanced central banks reduce the size of their balance sheets, caution must be taken on the 
spillover effects of unconventional monetary policy announcements. The BOE, BOJ and ECB 
have not yet embarked on an easing programme, therefore due to the financial linkages that 
exist with emerging market economies uncertainty on the unwinding or prolongation of low 
interest rates is expected among market participants. Our results indicate that a change in 
unconventional monetary policy has an effect on investor sentiments and asset prices. Other 
scholars also show that it has an effect on leverage and risk taking. The changes in 
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unconventional monetary policy in the three advanced central banks i.e. BOE, BOJ and ECB 
will occur at different emerging market business cycles, therefore the spill over effects are not 
expected to be consistent across regions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Page | 50 
 
       CHAPTER FIVE 
                  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1  Research Summary 
The increase in the size of balance sheets of central banks has gained much attention after the 
financial crisis amongst most market participants. There remains a concern on how a 
continuous increase or decrease in the size of balance sheets of advanced central banks have 
an impact on asset prices. This study, starts with determining the expectations of market 
participants using 10 year government bond futures. Using panel data on 15 emerging market 
countries over the period 2009 – 2015, the research examined how unconventional monetary 
policy announcements affect asset prices in a two day window period. The research further 
uses an event study to assess how unconventional monetary policy announcements affect 
investor sentiments.  
5.2  Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
It was observed that bond prices are more reactive than equity prices in the window period that 
was selected. Emerging market currencies have had higher returns against the Japanese yen on 
most selected event days while they exhibit lower returns against the British pound on most 
event days. In absolute terms, there have been more gains of emerging market currency against 
the US dollar over the whole sample period. 
The results show that the effects of the announcements are better captured over a two 
day period as found by other scholars. Higher deviations on days that are selected as event days 
indicate the announcements are surprising to market participants. The 10 year government bond 
future prices were used as a proxy to represent the extent to which market participants 
anticipate the announcements. How fast bond holders’ price in the announced information into 
the government bond futures prices indicates how efficient the advanced financial markets are. 
Changes in the 10 year government bond futures yield has resulted in gains of emerging market 
local currencies against the Japanese yen on selected event days while there have been more 
absolute gains over the whole period against the U.S dollar.  
5.3  Summary on expectations of market participants 
The U.S Federal Reserve has taken a leading role in changing monetary policy after the 
financial crisis. During this period, forward guidance is one of the unconventional monetary 
policy tools that has extensively been used by advanced central banks in an effort to try and 
make the general public and market participants understand the future direction of monetary 
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policy. This has been done in order to anchor inflation expectations of market participants. The 
degree of consensus between the intention of the central banks and market participants has 
shown us the extent to which forward guidance has been effective after the financial crisis.  
The analysis shows that forward guidance has been effective but more effort still needs 
to be made in making the public understand the direction of monetary policy and how to 
estimate the policy rule in order to improve the consensus with market participants. The BOE 
announcements have had the weakest consensus with market participants. The BOJ has 
implemented accommodative unconventional monetary policy for the longest period of time in 
an effort to eliminate the deflationary pressures faced by the economy. Hence, it can be 
observed from the results that it has been more successful in making the public and market 
participants understand the future path of monetary policy. The results also show that there was 
more consensus when the FED announced restrictive monetary policy. Even though the results 
show that there was stronger consensus, when the FED made the announcement to begin 
tapering in December 2013, it caused a selloff in various asset classes.  
To this effect, the research alludes that more consideration must be put in the 
formulation of monetary policy as was proposed in Eichengreen et al. (2011). The research 
findings are at odds with the findings of Svensson (2011) who argue that the U.S Federal 
Reserve acts within its mandate despite the spill over effects that are evident across borders. 
Through the portfolio rebalancing channel, announcements do cause a spill over effect as 
investors may hold a portfolio of different asset classes denominated in different currencies.  
Also, our results on market expectations show that the words or pharases used by central 
banks has a significant effects on market expectations. In July 2012, Mario Draghi (ECB 
president) used the words “whatever it takes” in his speech at a London conference which gave 
investors more confidence in the Euro. Following the commitment of the ECB president, bond 
yields fell across the Euro zone. 
5.4  Summary on effects on asset prices  
The study finds that the effect of unconventional monetary policy are more pronounced in 
emerging markets currencies. Other studies (Bernhard and Ebner, 2017) find that UMP has an 
effect on currencies of advanced economies but have lower coefficients which indicates that 
the spill over effects on the days that announcements are made is amplified in emerging market 
economies. Equities in emerging market economies do show that they experience spill over 
effects on the days that announcements are made. The spill over effects is stronger on equities 
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and bonds. Both equities and bonds exhibit stronger spill over effects on days with 
unconventional monetary policy relative to other spill overs in advanced economies. 
 
5.5  Summary on the effect of Investor Sentiment 
This study lastly examines the effect of unconventional monetary policy announcements on 
investor sentiments. An event study was employed to assess the impact of unconventional 
monetary policy. Our results are consistent with other studies (See Lutz, 2015) who use a 
different data set and time period.  The results indicate that an accommodative unconventional 
monetary policy announcement increases investor sentiments. Whereas a restrictive 
unconventional monetary policy reduces investor sentiments. Our results further indicate that 
unprecedented announcements such as the tapper tantrum result in speculation among investors 
as it was observe from varying direction of the sentiment indicators. The study also finds that 
words or phrases used when making announcements (Such as: dovish, hawkish, whatever it 
takes) have an effect on the investor sentiments.  
Therefore, it is vital for central banks in emerging markets to inform or teach the general 
public (i.e. market participants and investors) its way of thinking considering the spillover 
effects observed on emerging market asset prices on the selected event days. In addition, 
market participants need to understand the words and phrases contained in central bank 
announcements in order for them to understand the direction of the local or global economy as 
they make their decisions.  
As earlier stated, Akerlof et al. (2000) finds that the coefficient on expected inflation 
in the Philips curve has evolved. Recent studies (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015; Nalewaik, 
2016) have found that consumer expectations is statistically significant in the setting of prices 
and wages. A consideration of market expectations was put in place before examining the 
investor sentiments. Market expectations of advanced central banks has improved with the 
provision of forward guidance. This entails that emerging market economies must endeavour 
to make the public understand monetary policy in order to anchor inflation expectations which 
has an effect on the setting of asset prices.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Page | 53 
 
REFERENCES 
Aguiar, M and Gita, G. (2007). Emerging market business cycles: The cycle is the trend. 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol, 115(1), pp. 69-102. [Online]. Available at 
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11988098/. Accessed on 27 July 2017 
 
Ahmed, S & Zlate, A. (2014). Capital flows to emerging market economies: A brave new 
world? Journal of International Money and Finance, vol. 4, pp. 221-248. 
Akerlof, G.A., Dickens, W.T., and Perry, G.L. (2000). Near-Rational Wage and Price Setting 
and the Optimal Rates of Inflation and Unemployment. Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, pp.1-27. [Online]. Available at 
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~akerlof/docs/inflatn-employm.pdf. Accessed on 4 July 2017. 
 
Anaya, P., Hachula, M., & Offermanns, J. C. (2017). Spillovers of U.S. unconventional 
monetary policy to emerging markets: The role of capital flows. Journal of International 
Money and Finance, Vol 73, pp. 275-295. [Online]. Available  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261560617300256. Accessed on 27 July 
2017. 
 
Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. (2006). Investor Sentiment and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. 
The Journal of Finance, Vol No, 4, pp. 1 – 36. 
 
Bauer, M. D., & Rudebusch, G. D. (2014). The Signalling Channel for Federal Reserve Bond 
Purchases. International Journal of Central Banking, Vol, 10 (3), pp. 233–289. 
 
Bauer, M. D. and Neely, C. J. (2014). International Channels of the Fed’s Unconventional 
Monetary Policy. FRB of St. Louis Working Paper, No. 028. Journal of International Money 
and Finance, pp. 20 - 36. [Online]. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2138402.  Accessed 
on 27 July 2017 
 
Berge, T. J., Cao, G., (2014). Global Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy: Is Unconventional Policy 
Different? Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review Q I, pp. 5–31. [Online]. 
Available at https://www.kansascityfed.org/ZiiaZ/publicat/econrev/pdf/14q1Berge-Cao.pdf. 
Accessed on 27 July 2017. 
 
Bernhard, S., & Ebner, T. (2017). Cross-border Spillover Effects of Unconventional Monetary 
Policies on Swiss Asset Prices, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol 78, pp.109-
127. [Online]. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2017.04.001 Accessed 16 
May 2007. 
 
  
 
 
 
Page | 54 
 
Bernanke, S. B. (2004). “Fedspeak.” Remarks at the Meetings of the American Economic 
Association, San Diego. [Online] Available at:  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200401032/default.htm. Accessed 2 
June 2017. 
  
Bernanke, S. B. (2010). “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble,” Speech at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Georgia. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm. Accessed 11 
July 2017. 
 
Bank for International Settlements (2012).  82nd Annual Report, June, Chapter IV, pp. 34 -39. 
 
Blinder, A., Fratzscher, M., Ehrmann, M., Jansen, D., & De Haan, J. (2008). Central bank 
communication and monetary policy: A survey of theory and evidence. Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 46 (4), pp. 910–945. 
 
Blinder, A. (1998). Central banking in theory and practice, (4th edition). MIT Press, Cambridge 
and London. 
 
Bodie, Z., Kane, A., & Marcus, A. J. (2011). Investments. New York, McGraw-Hill/Irwin. pp. 
528. 
 
Borio, C. & Disyatat, P. (2011). Global imbalances and the financial crisis: Link or no link? 
BIS Working Papers, No 346, pp. 20 – 31. 
 
Bowman, D., Londono, J., M., & Sapriza, H. (2015). U.S. Unconventional Monetary Policy 
and Transmission to Emerging Market Economies. Journal of International Money and 
Finance, pp. 27–59. 
 
Brunner, K. (1981). The art of Central banking. Center for Research in Government Policy and 
Business Working Paper No GPB 81 Graduate School of Management, University of 
Rochester. 
 
Carroll, C. (2003). Macroeconomic expectations of households and professional forecasters. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 118 (1), pp. 269–298. 
 
Caruana, J. (2012). International Monetary Policy Interactions: Challenges and Prospects. 
[Online] Retrieved from http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp121116.htm Accessed 4th June 2017. 
Accessed on 30th May 2017. 
 
Chen, J., Griffoli, M., & Sahay, R. (2014). Spillovers from United States Monetary Policy on 
Emerging Markets: Different This Time? IMF Working Paper, Vol 14(240), pp. 1-30. 
 
  
 
 
 
Page | 55 
 
Chen, Q., Filardo, A., He, D., & Zhu, F. (2012). International Spillovers of Central Bank 
Balance Sheet Policies. Are Central Bank Balance Sheets in Asia too Large? Bank for 
International Settlements, Vol 66, pp. 220-264. 
 
Coenen, G., Orphanides, A., & Wieland, V. (2004). Price stability and monetary policy 
effectiveness when nominal interest rates are bounded at zero. ECB Working Paper Series, No 
231, pp. 1-39. 
 
Coibion, O., & Gorodnichenko, Y., (2015). Information rigidity and the expectations formation 
process: a simple framework and new facts. NBER Working Paper, No 105(8), pp. 2644–2678. 
 
Cox, J., Ingersol, J., & Ross, S. (1985). A Theory of the Term Structure of Interest Rates. 
Econometrica, Volume 53 (Issue 2), pp. 385 – 408. 
 
Eggertsson, B., & Woodford, M. (2003). The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal 
Monetary Policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol 34 (1), pp. 139–235. 
 
Eichengreen, B., Rajan, R., & Prasad, E., (2011). Central Banks Need a Bigger and Bolder 
Mandate. Financial Times. 
 
Eijffinger, S. C. W., & De Haan, J. (2000). European Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 1-50. 
 
Eusepi, S., & Preston, B. (2007). Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization. 
NBER Working Paper No. 13259, pp 24 – 40. 
 
Faust, J., Rogers, S.-Y. B., J. H., Wang, & Wright, J. H. (2007). The High-Frequency Response 
of Exchange Rates and Interest Rates to Macroeconomic Announcements. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, pp. 1051–1068. 
 
Fischer, S. (2001). Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct? Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol 15(2), pp. 3-24. 
 
Fratzscher, M., Duca, M. L., & Straub, R. (2013). On the International Spillovers of US 
Quantitative Easing. DIW Berlin Discussion Papers 1304, DIW Berlin, German Institute for 
Economic Research. pp. 26 – 64. 
 
Glick, R., & Leduc, S. (2012). Central Bank Announcements of Asset Purchases and the Impact 
on Global Financial and Commodity Markets. Journal of International Money and Finance, 
Vol 31 (8), pp. 2078–2101. 
 
Ho, C. and McCauley, N. R. (2003). Living with flexible exchange rates: issues and recent 
experience in inflation targeting emerging market economies. BIS Working Paper No, 130 pp. 
  
 
 
 
Page | 56 
 
27- 33. [Online] Retrieved from https://www.bis.org/publ/work130.pdf. Accessed on 25 July 
2017. 
 
Hofmann, B & Bogdanova, B. (2012). Taylor rules and monetary policy: a global "Great 
Deviation"? BIS Quarterly Review, pp. 37 – 46. 
 
IMF. (2013a). Spillover Report: Analytical Underpinnings and other Background. 
 
IMF. (2013b). Unconventional Monetary Policies: Recent Experiences and Prospects. 
 
Joyce, M., Tong, M. & Woods, R. (2011). The United Kingdom’s quantitative easing policy: 
design, operation and impact. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Q3, Vol, 51(3), pp. 200 –
212. 
 
Joyce, M., Lasaosa, A., Stevens, I., & Tong, M. (2011). The financial market impact of 
quantitative easing. International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 7(3), pp. 113–161. 
   
Joyce, M., & Tong, M. (2012). QE and the gilt market: a disaggregated analysis. Economic 
Journal, Vol. 122(564), pp. F348–84. 
 
Krishnamurthy, A.and -Jorgensen, J. A. (2011). The Effects of Quantitative Easing on Interest 
Rates, pp. 1 – 37. 
 
Korniyenko, Y and Loukoianova, E. (2015). The Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy 
Measures by the Systemic Four on Global Liquidity and Monetary Conditions. IMF Working 
Paper No 15(287), pp. 1 – 43. 
 
Krugman, P. (1998). It’s back: Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Vol 292, pp. 137–206. 
 
Kurov, A. (2010). Investor sentiment and the stock market's reaction to monetary policy. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol 34, pp. 139 – 149. 
 
Lucas, R. (1976). Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique.  Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol 1, pp.19-46. 
 
Lutz, C. (2015). The Impact of Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy on Investor 
Sentiment. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol 61, pp. 89-205. [Online] Retrieved from: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2363938. Accessed on 25 July 2017. 
 
Modigliani, F. and R. Sutch. (1966). Innovations in Interest-Rate Policy. American Economic 
Review, Vol 56, pp.178-197. [Online] Retrieved from  
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1821281.pdf. Accessed on 25 July 2017. 
  
 
 
 
Page | 57 
 
 
Nalewaik, J. (2016). Non – Linear Philips curves with inflation regime switching. Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series, Vol, 78, pp. 1 – 56. [Online] Retrieved from 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016078pap.pdf. Accessed on 29 
July 2017. 
 
Obstfeld, M. (2012). Does the Current Account Still Matter? American Economic Review, 
American Economic Association, Vol 102(3), pp. 1-23. 
 
Ojah, K. & Karemera, D. (1999). Random walks and market efficiency tests of Latin America 
emerging equity markets: A revisit. The Financial Review, pp. 55 – 72. 
 
Reifschneider, D., & Williams, C. (2000). Three lessons for monetary policy in a low-inflation 
era. Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, Vol 32, pp. 936–966. 
 
Rey, H. (2013). Dilemma not trilemma: the global financial cycle and monetary policy 
independence. In: Proceedings of the economic policy symposium at Jackson Hole, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Online] Retrieved from  
http://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedkpr/y2013x9.html. Accessed 10 June 2017. 
 
Rey, H. & Agrippino, M. S. (2014). World Asset Markets and the Global Financial Cycle. pp. 
2- 4. [Online] Retrieved from 
http://www.helenerey.eu/AjaxRequestHandler.ashx?Function=GetSecuredDOC&DOCUrl=A
pp_Data Accessed 17 June 2017. 
 
Rogers, J., Chiara, S., and Wright, J. H. (2014). Evaluating Asset Market Effects of 
Unconventional Monetary Policy: A Multi-Country Review. International Finance Discussion 
Papers, No 1101, pp. 3–50. 
 
Romer, C. D. and Romer, D. H. (1989).  Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the 
Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz,” in Olivier J. Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, eds., NBER 
Cambridge, MIT Press, pp. 121–170. 
 
Ross, A.S. Cox, J.C. & Ingersoll, J. (1985). A theory of the term structure of interest rates. 
Econometrica, Vol 53, No 2, pp. 385 – 387.  
 
Shin, S. H. & Bruno, V. (2013). Capital Flows and the Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary 
Policy, Griswold Center for Economic Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 237, pp. 28 – 39. 
 
Sahay, R., Arora, V., Arvanitis, T., Faruqee, H., N'Diaye, P., Griffoli, M. T. (2014). Emerging 
Market Volatility: Lessons from the Taper Tantrum. IMF, pp. 16 – 25. [Online] Retrieved from 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2014/sdn1409.pdf. Accessed 17 June 2017. 
 
  
 
 
 
Page | 58 
 
Stefano, E., & Preston, B. (2007). Central Bank Communication and Expectations 
Stabilization.  NBER Working Paper 13259. 
 
Svensson, O. E. L. (2001). The zero bound in an open economy: a fool proof way of escaping 
from a liquidity trap. Handbook of Monetary Economics, Vol 3A, pp. 277–312. 
Svensson, O. E. L. (2003). What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary 
Policy through Targeting Rules. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 41, pp. 426-477. [Online] 
Retrieved from 
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/002205103765762734. Accessed 03 July 2017. 
 
Taylor, B. J. (2013). International Monetary Policy Coordination: Past, Present and Future. 
Tech. rep. 
 
Taylor, B. J. (2012). Monetary policy rules work and discretion doesn’t: a tale of two eras”, 
The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Lecture.  
 
Tobin, J. (1961). Money, Capital, and Other Stores of Value. The American Economic 
Review, Vol 51(2), pp. 26-37. [Online] Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1914465.  
Accessed 07 July 2017. 
 
Vayanos, D. & Vila, L. (2009). A preferred-habitat model of the term structure of interest rates. 
NBER Working Paper No. 15487. 
 
Vincent, R., Bernanke, B., & Brian, S. (2004). Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: 
An Empirical Assessment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol 2, pp. 1-100. 
 
Westerfield, W. R., Ross, A.S. & Jordan, B. D. (2006). Corporate Finance Fundamentals. 
McGraw Hill international (7th ed, pp. 221 – 226). 
 
White, H. (1980). A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct 
Test for Heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, Vol 48(4), pp. 817-38. 
 
Wilson, D. (2003). Dreaming with BRICS: The Path to 2050. Goldman Sachs, Global 
Economics Paper, No 99, pp. 2- 4. 
 
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Woodford, M. (2001). Imperfect common knowledge and the effects of monetary policy. In: 
Aghion, P., Frydman, R., Stiglitz, J., Woodford, M. (Eds.), Knowledge, Information, and 
Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics: In Honor of Edmund S Phelps. Princeton University 
Press. 
  
 
 
 
Page | 59 
 
Yellen, J. (2014). What the Federal Reserve is doing to promote a stronger job market. In: 
National Interagency Community Reinvestment Conference. Chicago, Illinois. [Online] 
Retrieved from https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140331a.htm 
Accessed on 1st June 2017. 
APPENDIX 
Figure 1: BOJ UMP announcements and forward guidance 
    Date                         Announcement Description 
18/12/2009 Clarification of medium to long term inflation 
18/03/2009 Changes in the amount of Japanese government bonds from ¥16.8 tn to 
¥21.6tn 
19/02/2009 Purchase of corporate bonds and extension of commercial paper buying 
scheme 
28/01/2010 Completion of temporal reciprocal currency arrangements. 
03/08/2010 Introduction of a six month term in the fixed funds rate in an effort to reduce 
market interest rates. 
05/10/2010 Maintenance of uncollateralized overnight call rate 0% to 0.1% and the 
establishment of an asset purchase programme 
05/11/2010 Framework for purchase of assets in total of ¥35tn including risky assets. 
14/03/2011 Increases in asset purchases in Japanese government bond, Discount bills, 
Corporate bonds, ETFs & Japanese REITS. 
21/05/2011 Private financial institutions initiative to support fund provisioning. 
27/10/2011 Increase in the asset purchase programme by ¥5tn. 
20/12/2012 New additional funds to be provided in the form of asset purchases and loan 
support program. 
Source: The announcements were collected from the Bank of Japan website.  
Figure 2: ECB UMP announcements and forward guidance 
Date                            Announcement Description 
15/01/2009  Interest rate reduced by 50 basis points to 2%. 
05/02/2009 Maintained interest rates on Refinancing operations, marginal lending 
facility & deposit facility 2%, 3% and 1% respectively. 
04/06/2009 Purchase of Euro covered bonds amounting to €60bn. 
27/01/2010 E.C.B and other Central banks end the temporal Swap arrangements with 
the FED. 
03/05/2010 Changes in the eligibility of debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the 
Greek government. 
10/06/2010 Maintained interest rates on Refinancing operations, marginal lending 
facility & deposit facility 1%, 1.75% and 0.25% respectively. 
16/12/2010 Decision to increase its subscribed capital from €5bn to €10.76bn. 
06/10/2011 Additional financing by purchasing covered bonds of €40bn. 
07/07/2011 Increase by 25 basis points on refinancing operations, lending facility 
deposit facility. 
08/12/2011 Reduction of the reserve ratio from 2% to 1% and conduct longer term 
refinancing operations. 
08/03/2012 Acknowledgement of the eligibility of bonds guaranteed or issued by the 
Greek government. 
31/10/2012 The end of purchases of covered bonds. 
  
 
 
 
Page | 60 
 
22/03/2013 Adoption on the prevention of use of collateral of certain uncovered 
government guaranteed bank bonds 
08/11/2013 Gives its opinion on the Single Resolution Mechanism. 
22/11/2013 Suspension of early repayments of 3 year Long Term Refinancing 
Operations. A 
16/09/2013 Extension of the Swap facility with BOE for a further one year 
Source: The announcements were collected from ECB website. 
Figure 3: BOE UMP announcements and forward guidance 
    Date                           Announcement Description 
08/01/2009 Reduction of the bank rate by 50 basis points to 1.5%. 
05/03/2009 Reduction of the Operational standing deposit facility from 0.75% to 0%, 
purchase of assets at £75bn. 
05/11/2009 Increase asset purchases by £25bn and maintain the bank rate at 0.5%. 
10/06/2010 Maintain the bank rate at 0.5% and asset purchases worth £200bn. 
09/12/2010 Maintain the bank rate at 0.5% and asset purchases worth £200bn. 
06/10/2011 An increase in asset purchases by £75bn implying a total of £275bn. 
08/12/2011 Maintain the bank rate at 0.5% and asset purchases worth £275bn. 
07/06/2012 Relaxation of regulatory liquidity requirements and additional Funding for 
Lending Scheme 
06/12/2012 Maintain asset purchases at £375bn and maintain the bank rate at 0.5%. 
09/05/2013 Extension of the Funding for Lending Scheme until 2015. 
01/08/2013 Forward guidance on maintenance of the bank rate depending on the 
improvement of the labour market. 
05/12/2013 Forward guidance was given even as unemployment remained above 7%. 
13/04/2016 Increase in the countercyclical capital buffer rate for UK exposures to 0.5%. 
04/08/2016 Reduction of the bank rate by 25 basis points to 2.5% and introduction of a 
Term Funding Scheme. 
Source: The announcements were collected from BOE website. 
Figure 4: FED UMP announcements and forward guidance 
     Date                                    Announcement Description 
28/01/2009 Federal funds rate target range reduced to 0% to 0.25%. 
04/06/2009 FED, BOE, ECB, BOJ & SNB announce Swap arrangements. 
16/01/2010 Authorisation of the FED of New York to purchase $175bn in housing 
related agency debt and 1.25 Mortgage Backed Securities. 
28/04/2010 Closure of liquidity facilities leaving only Asset Backed Securities loan 
facility. 
10/08/2010 Additional purchases of longer term treasury securities and reinvestment of 
principal repayments of large scale asset purchases 
03/11/2010 An additional $600bn purchases of long term treasuries 
22/06/2011 Completion of purchases worth $600bn of long term treasury securities by 
the end of June 2011. 
21/09/2011 Intention to purchase $400 bn of Treasury Securities by June 2012. 
13/03/2012 Forward guidance on interest rates and inflation expectations which were 
expected to remain low until 2014. 
31/07/2013 Continuation of Mortgage Backed Securities and Treasury Securities. 
30/10/2013 Continuation of asset purchases until stronger evidence of economic 
recovery was achieved. 
18/12/2013 Reduction of asset purchases beginning January 2014. 
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19/03/2014 Forward guidance as the unemployment approaches 6% to 6.5% 
18/06/2014 A reduction in asset purchases to $35bn in July 2014. 
28/10/2015 Federal funds rate target range maintained at 0% to 0.25%. 
14/12/2016 Federal funds rate raised to 0.5% to 0.75%. 
Source: The announcements were collected from the Federal Reserve Bank website. 
